Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LUFTWAFFE AGAINST POLAND
fighters. As combat experience spread throughout Fighter Command, the
British quickly adapted their tactics to fit the realities of the situation. The
lesson, however, was a costly one.
In retrospect, the prospects on the German side were less bright. Not
only had the Luftwaffe tipped its hand, but nothing had yet broken the
overconfidence clouding the minds of German commanders. They had in
fact learned little about the workings of the British air defense system. An
early August intelligence estimate announced:
As the British fighters were controlled from the ground by RIT their forces are tied
to their respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in mobility, even taking
into consideration the possibility that the ground stations are partly mobile.
Consequently, the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at
short notice is not to be expected. A massed German attack on a target area can
therefore count on the same conditions of light fighter opposition as in attacks on
widely scattered targets. It can, indeed, be assumed that considerable confusion in
the defensive networks will be unavoidable during mass attacks, and that the effectiveness
of the defenses may thereby be reduced.It9
Thus, as planning for the assault on the British air defenses neared fruition,
the Germans had as little idea of their opponent and his tactics as they had
enjoyed at the beginning of July.
Eagle Day was to begin on August 10, but bad weather delayed the
start to the 13th. On that day the Germans again postponed operations-to
the afternoon-but too late to recall bombers, which insured that most
bomber strikes in the morning possessed no fighter cover. As the Germans
muddled their way into battle, the British felt a clear change in tempo
beginning on August 11. On that day German fighter sweeps, in combination
with a large raid on southern ports, resulted in a furious dogfight over
the channel that cost No. 11 Group dearly. By the end of the day the British
had twenty Hurricane pilots killed with two wounded and five Spitfire
pilots killed (over seven percent of No. 11 Group's pilots in one day). German
losses were also heavy, and while losing only twelve Bf-109 pilots, the
Luftwaffe lost twenty-five other aircraft and two more Bf-109s from which
the pilots escaped unharmed.I2O
The fighting on August 11 heralded the start of massive air battles lasting
for the next week. On the afternoon of the 13th the Germans began their
attacks on the RAF and its support structure. Raids on airfields, sector
stations, and aircraft factories now became the center of the Luftwaffe's
attention. Ironically and almost inexplicably, German intelligence misidentified
the parent factory for Spitfire production in Southampton as a bomber
firm, and not until much later (and for the wrong reasons) did they hit this
critical target.l*' Moreover, the Germans made a serious mistake in failing
to follow up their August 12 attacks on radar sites that had damaged five
out of the six stations and put the Ventnor station entirely off the air until
August 23. 122
On August 15, discouraged by the lack of results and the tenacity of
97