Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
never need to engage in a twisting, rolling dogfight. With its radar and
guided weapons, the F-4C was meant to detect and destroy enemy aircraft
before they came close. Over North Vietnam, however, the Rules of
Engagement required U.S. aircraft to see those aircraft they attacked.
This requirement virtually negated the value of the Sparrow, which
was designed to be used outside the range of the Phantom pilot’s eyesight.
Indeed, one advantage of F-4 series aircraft was that they carried two crew
members-one to fly and one to monitor the plane’s radar and engage targets
beyond visual range. Over North Vietnam, however, a “target” might
turn out to be a civilian airliner flying to Hanoi but outside the prescribed
approach lanes, or-in 1965-a U.S. plane damaged and therefore straggling
behind its parent formation. The areas of the Route Packages, VI A
and VI B, north and east of Hanoi, that were open to attack were not that
large, and, with Navy and Air Force attack groups striking adjacent sections,
effective battle management was a challenge. A tight Rule of Engagement
on air-to-air missile firings was one solution to that problem, but a
negative consequence was the elimination of one of the advantages of the
F4’s radar and air-to-air missile combination. In effect, the F-4Cs assigned
to escort F-105s could use only Falcons and Sidewinders, and the Falcon
was not available in 1965.
The key to dealing with the MiG threat, however, turned out to be the
introduction of the EC-121 aerial early warning radar surveillance planes.
With both endurance and radars of great range, these aircraft could detect
MiGs taking off from airfields within North Vietnam’s sanctuaries. This
early warning proved to be decisive. The combat radius figures from Table
10-7 are the clue to why that was so. USAF strike forces flying from Thailand
to the area near and north of Hanoi had to refuel inflight. Even with
inflight refueling, however, the fuel margins for aircraft hitting targets in
Route Package VI A were tight. The NVAF would attempt to hold its MiCs
until the last possible launch time in order to give them a fuel advantage
over the U.S. F-4s. If the F-4s could be alerted to the launch of MiGs as
soon as the enemy planes were in the air, their usefulness as escorts would
be much greater. The EC-l2ls, working under the code names BIG EYE
and COLLEGE EYE, gave the Phantom escort flights the warning they
needed to organize an effective defense. By the end of the second week of
July 1965, the NVAF was compelled to withdraw from the aerial battle. The
combination of EB-66s, F-~CS, EC-121 s, and Sidewinders had thwarted
the threat of its MiG-17s.
On July 24, 1965, the North Vietnamese launched the first of thousands
of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles against U.S. strike aircraft. The SA-2 was a
radar beam-rider with a range of about 25 nm. When near its target, it was
guided to an intercept by its own radar seeker. Before the SA-2s appeared,
U.S. aircraft avoided much enemy ground fire by flying above it.4’ The
SA-~S, most effective at altitudes near 20,000 feet, ruled out this tactic.
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