Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE
Very early on the morning of October 6, 1973-Yorn Kipprrr, the Day
of Atonement-Israeli intelligence reported that an attack would come,
north and south, at 1800 hours. A partial mobilization of ground forces was
ordered-the IAF had already been “placed on alert” on September 26-
but, four hours earlier than predicted, the Egyptians crossed the canal and
the Syrians struck simultaneously on the Golan Heights. In the Sinai the
EAF attacked three air bases and airfields, ten HAWK SAM missile sites,
three major command posts, and electronic jamming and monitoring centers
as well as a number of radar The Egyptians admitted losing
five aircraft from unspecified causes,” while the Israelis would claim a total
of forty-two Egyptian planes downed before nightfall.Y6
The Egyptian Tu-16s destroyed in 1967 had been replaced, but they were
now used simply as launching platforms for the Kelt air-to-ground missile
with its 1,600-pound high-explosive warhead. The Egyptians apparently
launched about 25 such missiles at targets deep inside the Sinai, mostly radar
sites. The standard Kelt was, like the V-weapons of Second World War vintage,
an unguided missile, but some of this particular batch may have been
fitted with a radiation homing capability, for radars make singularly small targets
in the vastness of the Sinai but at ‘least 2 stations took direct hitsy7 One
Kelt that allegedly went astray in the direction of Tel Aviv was intercepted by
an Israeli fighter and promptly shot down.yx
In the north, the Syrian Air Force “provided a considerable degree of
close support to the ground forces attacking on the Golan Heights,”yy
attempting to break through the Israeli air defenses to bomb targets in the
Huleh valley. “In the ensuing air battles, however, the Israelis had no difficulty
in securing their own airspace, and the Syrian jets lost heavily against
Mirages and Phantoms.”“”’ Shortly afterwards. when the Iraqis joined the
fight, “it is reported that the only attempt to break through the Israeli air
defense system was made by two Iraqi Tu-16 bombers. They did not succeed
in reaching Tel Aviv; and one of the bombers was shot down,” according
to General Palit, who had close ties with the Syrian military
authorities.I‘” The Arab attacks had been well coordinated both in space
and time despite the wide separation of their command systems, but the
Israelis, fighting from interior lines over relatively short distances and with
the advantage of a single, centralized control from “the Pit” in Tel Aviv,
were able to thwart the enemy on each occasion.
When the Israelis turned to offensive action of their own during the
afternoon of the 6th. however, they got a rude shock. Along the line of the
Suez Canal a couple of hundred Israeli soldiers were in danger of being
trapped in the fortified strongpoints of the Bar Lev Line and overwhelmed.
The IAF’s first ground support priority was to try and help them, but the
Mirages and Phantoms assigned to provide protection for other Phantoms
and Skyhawks attacking ground targets were quite unable to do so. The
threat came from below, not above; from missiles, not MiGs.
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