Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

OPERATION OVERLORD
Luftwaffe in order to reduce its frontline strength before the launching of
OVERLORD. Spaatz told the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces at the beginning
of March that they were now to plan their operations with a view, not
to avoid the German defenses, but to “invite air opposition when we have
fighter
Spaatz and his staff also thought that the decisiveness of their attacks
in February opened the door to a strategy that promised not only continued
attacks on the Luftwaffe but also the defeat of the whole German war
effort. They believed that the opportunity now existed to demonstrate the
ability of strategic bombing to win the war. Spaatz wrote to Maj. Gen.
Nathan Twining, Commander of the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, to say that
the February raids had placed USSTAF “on the threshold of our real purpose;
the piece by piece demolition of the German war machine by precision
bombing.”78 Early in February, General Anderson directed the
USSTAF planners to produce a plan of operations to be implemented after
the completion of the major attacks against aircraft production. Special
urgency existed because OVERLORD was approaching and the time to make
a convincing demonstration of strategic air power was shrinking. Anderson
also wanted to prevent the strategic air forces from becoming too closely
tied to a proposal made by the AEAF planners to use the strategic air
forces to attack transportation targets in France.79
USSTAF’s deliberations were governed by three requirements. The
plan had to contribute to the existence of air superiority at the time of the
invasion. A plan that did not do that had no hope of being approved. It also
had to “favor a RANKIN,” that is, it had to hold out the promise of
bringing about a German collapse without a major invasion. Finally, in
the event such a collapse did not materialize, it must make a maximum
contribution to the success of OVERLORD. Synthetic oil production was the
target system which best met these requirements because the Luftwaffe
would fight in defense of such vital targets and suffer attrition. Success
would deprive the Luftwaffe of aviation gasoline; it might precipitate a
collapse of the German war effort altogether. Failing that, it would at least
seriously undermine the fighting power of the German army by limiting its
mobi1ity.m
The month of March saw an intense debate between USSTAF and its
supporters on the one hand and AEAF and the advocates of the assault on
the French railway system-the Transportation Plan-on the other. These
arguments culminated in a meeting of March 25 at which Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, adopted the Transportation
Plan. He and his deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder came to
believe that the effects of the Oil Plan would occur too late to have an
immediate bearing on the invasion itself.81 This did not mean, however,
that the Oil Plan was entirely set aside. Eisenhower and Tedder both believed
that air superiority should continue to be the first charge on the
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