Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHEAST ASIA
later, in the 1972 LINEBACKER operations) was an epic in itself, and its
success illustrated the tremendous benefits gained from achieving air
superiority. ROLLING THUNDER also proved that the F-4, designed as
a fighter-bomber, could, if handled properly, hold its own in air-to-air
combat with high performance aircraft. Finally, the continued but politically
constrained air operations over North Vietnam revealed that tactical
aircraft could operate within SAM envelopes and in the face of heavy antiaircraft
fire.
The decision by North Vietnam to develop an integrated air defense
system was both necessary and wise. Lacking an adequate air force and the
resources to develop a large one, the North Vietnamese had no choice but
to rely on missiles and antiaircraft fire. Yet as U.S. planes climbed to avoid
ground fire, they grew more vulnerable to SAMs, and, if the aircraft
reduced their approach and departure altitudes to get below the minimum
SAM range, they increased their vulnerability to MiGs. This was a particularly
serious problem for reconnaissance aircraft, which were required by
the Rules of Engagement to fly missions after strikes at medium altitudes.x6
The North Vietnamese had a system of weapons whose functions were
complementary.
Overcoming that combination of weapons was not easy. The most
effective counter to it turned out to be an attack formation structured to
fight effective electronic warfare. Each of these formations consisted of 8
or 10 flights of 4 aircraft, spread over about 25 square miles. Out in front
were 2 flights of Iron Hand F-105s. Behind them were the strike flights of
F~S, equipped (by 1970) with noise and deception jamming pods; the strike
aircraft were arranged so that their jammers covered enough of the formation’s
front to deny enemy radar operators a clear, reliable bearing and an
accurate range of their position. Right behind the strike force was 1 or more
photographic reconnaissance aircraft, and 2 or 3 nautical miles to the rear
were 2 F4s flying cover aginst MiG flights. When skies near the target
were overcast, such formations flew at least 4,000 feet above the clouds in
order not to be surprised by SAMs. Iron Hand flights fired Shrike or Standard
Antiradiation Missiles (ARMS) to force enemy fire control radars off
the air, and the first strike flights laid chaff clouds to confuse any radars
which went back into operation once the actual bombing attack began.
F4s flying cover against MiGs did not have to maintain a high altitude
because of the Phantom’s ability to climb and accelerate rapidly. The trick
was to hold formation integrity in order to maximize the benefits provided
by the jammers and chaff clouds.87 The only effective defense against such
a formation was a diving hit-and-run attack by MiG-2 1 s firing heat-seeking
air-to-air missiles. However, holding such a large formation together was
not easy; in addition, most missions flown after November 1968 did not
require such a large strike force, which meant that many strike missions
lacked indepth jamming and a heavy volume of chaff. Nevertheless, U.S.
strike formations had the ability to penetrate the heaviest North Vietnam-
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