Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

OPERATION OVERLORD
This delicately balanced strategy broke down in January 1944 when
General Montgomery arrived in London and proceeded to direct a revision
to the original OVERLORD plan which, among other things, widened the
frontage of the assault. To Leigh-Mallory and his planners, this reduced the
likelihood that the open ground beyond Caen would be captured early. To
offset the probability of a slower rate of airfield development in France,
AEAF now thought that the radius within which airfields would be attacked
should be enlarged from 110 miles to 130 miles.lo7
Leigh-Mallory published the final version of the overall air plan on
April 15, 1944. He proposed to attack about 50 major operational bases and
satellite landing grounds within the 130-mile radius. Because there were too
many targets to leave the task to the last few days before the landings, the
attacks were to be carried out in phases; first, against the installations that
took the longest to repair, such as maintenance facilities, and second,
against airfield surfaces. AEAF scheduled the first series of attacks to
begin on D-21, the second on D-5.I’Js
At this point, Leigh-Mallory and Spaatz clashed again. USSTAF and
Bomber Command had attacked French and German airfields as secondary
targets and targets of opportunity in the period between January and April.
USSTAF, however, was getting restive about airfield attacks. Shortly after
Leigh-Mallory issued his plan, General Anderson directed one of his staff
to look into the matter remarking, “It is believed that the number of bombs
striking on airdromes, near airdromes, airfields and in wooded areas,
results in an entirely undue excessive waste of effort.”l09 Spaatz wrote to
Eisenhower on May 5:
No allocation of effort by the Strategic Air Forces is recommended in the case of
airdromes in the battle area. These targets can be attacked more profitably by
lighter forces, particularly when occupied. Further, there are so many demands for
heavy bombers that there is no chance of effort being available.”0
The following day Spaatz put his case to Leigh-Mallory, saying that it was
more important to attack airfields in Germany from which long-range
bomber attacks might be launched against the invasion. He was seconded
by Air Vice-Marshal Oxland, the representative from Bomber Command to
AEAE who claimed that the plan demanded more effort than his command
could make available. Leigh-Mallory did not budge, saying that coverage
of the operational fields in the 130-mile radius was more important. It was
finally agreed that AEAF intelligence would, in consultation with the intelligence
branches of the other concerned commands, work out a priority
table for airfields. In the interim, Spaatz agreed to attack airfields as a
fourth priority behind the Luftwaffe, the secret weapons sites (from which
V-1 Buzz Bombs were launched beginning in June), and the Transportation
Plan targets.”’
Leigh-Mallory changed his mind the next day. He had apparently come
to believe that the attack on German lines of communications and the delay
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