Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
time. This inability to employ sizable numbers of fighters stemmed largely
from the difficulty of concentrating forces in insular Japan, which is characterized
by a lack of geographical depth and by the location of all strategically
crucial installations on the long Pacific coastline. Even if there had
been sufficient warning of enemy raids, and sufficient numbers of interceptors
to scramble, Japanese fighter planes were deficient in ceiling and rate
of climb. Designed essentially for ground support at an optimum altitude of
16,000 feet, the Army’s Type 2 NICK fighter required 7 minutes to climb to
that altitude; its maximum ceiling was 34,500 feet. The Navy’s GEKKO
fighter needed 9 minutes 35 seconds to reach 16,000 feet; its ceiling was
about 29,500 feet.
Like most Japanese AA artillery, the fighters had difficulty grappling
successfully with bombers flying at an altitude exceeding 26,000 feet. By
dint of rigorous training, stripped armor, and improved materiel, it became
possible by the summer of 1944 to fight at an altitude of about 29,500 feet
using such planes as a converted scout and a heavy bomber armed with
medium-caliber weapons. Still, the long-awaited high-altitude interceptors
did not progress beyond the experimental stage and were never used in
combat. For example, much was expected of the Mitsubishi SHUSUI, modeled
on the Messerschmitt Me-l63B, a sensational rocket-powered fighter.
The SHUSUI was designed with a maximum speed of 550 miles per hour at
33,000 feet, a service ceiling of 39,500 feet, and a capability of climbing to
33,000 feet in 3% minutes. By war’s end, production was underway, but
only 7 prototypes had been delivered for testing.
The best that ordinary Japanese interceptors could do at 33,000 feet
was to attack bombers in level flight; when they banked, they lost altitude
to a serious extent. Generally, the fighters could make only one pass at
a bomber. The problems were only compounded when experimental
large-caliber cannon were installed on certain IJAAF fighters and heavy
bombers, to enable them to cope with the B-29. A 10th Air Division officer
attributed Japanese aeronautical troubles to the country’s late start in science
and technology. If the Japanese had had fighters capable of climbing
regularly to 40,000 feet, he said, “we would have been able to do five times
as well at half the cost.060
Crippling losses of Japanese aircraft and flight personnel rendered
replacement very difficult. The new 10th Air Division Commander, General
Kond6, in the spring of 1945 sought to compensate by improving tactical
doctrine and procedures governing the operations of his units on guard in
the vital Kanto district. Thus he directed that instead of attempting constant
interception of intruding enemy planes and protection of strategic
locations, fighter units should engage only targets of opportunity. Emphasis
on battle against bombers should give way to training against fighters,
though decisive combat even against the latter must be avoided until thorough
training had been accomplished. In devising these plans, Kond6 was
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