Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

12
Some Concluding Insights
I. B. Holley, Jr.
The thoughtful individual who has read this volume will already have
derived many insights from the foregoing chapters. The pages that follow
offer a series of reminders for the reader and will also highlight some key
points. Confronted with the need to attain air superiority, what should be
done? What decisions can a commander reach that will make the task
easier? What factors are within his power to affect? What actions can he
initiate which will make a significant difference? It is of little value to
assert that he must have superior aircraft, greater numbers than his
enemy, and better trained crews. At this level of generalization, the need
for more and better is commonplace. The thoughtful commander needs
rather to know more explicitly how he can affect the attainment of these
desired goals.
An obvious first step is to conceptualize the task at hand. Precisely
what is meant by air superiority? The term air superiority most commonly
conjures up visions of fighter aircraft engaged in dogfighting, but as the
Italian theorist of air power, Giulio Douhet, suggested soon after World
War I, it is more efficient to destroy enemy aircraft as they sit immobile on
the ground. For many, this will bring to mind visions of World War I1 P-51
Mustangs or P-47 Thunderbolts swooping down on Luftwaffe airfields to
strafe parked German aircraft. But why wait until the enemy is able to
equip his air bases with combat-ready planes and pilots? Again, as Douhet
suggested, why not destroy the enemy’s capacity to fabricate aircraft in the
first place? So one visualizes ever larger numbers of bombers streaming
toward distant enemy production facilities, not only factories, but electric
generating stations, refineries, transportation systems, and all the compo-
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