Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
never threatened U.S. control of North Vietnam’s airspace. The war for the
air began on April 3, 1965, when the small NVAF rose to combat U.S. strike
aircraft. Though it began small (thirty MiG-I5/17s in August 1964),1S the
NVAF rapidly grew, and it continued to challenge (though not necessarily
to threaten) U.S. air superiority over North Vietnam through all the stages
of the Vietnam War.
On April 4, 1965, four NVAF MiG-17s were maneuvered around a covering
force of F-100s by North Vietnamese ground-control-intercept (GCI)
radars to attack a strike force of F-105s. Two F-105s were lost to the MiGs
over Thanh Hoa, seventy-six miles south of Hanoi. Without its bomb load,
the F-105 was actually faster at all altitudes than the MiG-17, but the MiG
was far more maneuverable, and North Vietnam’s GCI radar net could
place the MiGs in the path of incoming (and loaded) F-105s. forcing the
USAF attack planes to either jettison their bombs prematurely or risk being
shot down. (See Table 10-7) The F-100D was an inadequate escort for the
F-105 for two reasons: it was not as maneuverable as the MiG-17 or as
quick to climb. (See Table 10-8) The low wing loading of the MiG-17 gave
it a tight turning circle, and its relatively high thrust/weight ratio gave it a
quick acceleration which the heavier F-100D could not match. The Navy’s
F-SC had a thrusdweight ratio of .61 and good performance at higher altitudes,
and, though not as nimble as the MiG-17, was able to employ its
speed advantage when given sufficient room. The F-IO5D had been
designed to carry tactical nuclear weapons; it was designed to approach
targets at high speed and leave target areas at double the speed of sound.
F-105 tactical doctrine against MiG-17s was simple-outrun them; “never
try to out-turn or out-climb a MiG.”39
To deal with the MiG-I7s, the USAF I) moved a detachment of EB-66
electronic warfare aircraft to Southeast Asia in April, 2) replaced the
F-100Ds with F4C Phantoms, and 3) in July, began flying patrols over
the Gulf of Tonkin with EC-121 aerial early warning planes. The EF3-66~
carried radar jammers, which could mask the approach of U.S. strike
forces and reduce the effectiveness of North Vietnamese GCI radars. The
F-4C Phantoms were faster than the F-IOODs, quicker to accelerate,
far faster in a climb, and equipped with their own air intercept radar.
Though not as maneuverable as MiG-I7s, the F-4Cs could use their
treater power to determine when and how any air-to-air engagement
would begin.
Phantoms also could carry AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder, and
AIM4 Falcon air-to-air missiles. Sparrow was guided first by the Phantom’s
radar and then, in the proximity of its target, by its own radar seeker.
Its range was twenty to thirty miles. Sidewinder could use infrared homing
or be guided to tis target like Sparrow; its range as a radar-guided weapon
was approximately ten miles.@ With Sparrows and a shorter range missile,
the F-4C did not need the maneuverability of a MiG-17 because it would
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