Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
mented their strengths. Only after U.S. war production and pilot training
produced increased numbers of aircraft and pilots in 1952 was FEAF given
sufficient resources to demonstrate to the Chinese that further fighting
would cost more than it was worth. It may be true that a U.S. threat to use
nuclear weapons was instrumental in forcing an armistice. However, the
real key to maintaining air superiority over North Korea and containing the
Chinese Air Force in Manchuria was the tactical prowess and aggressiveness
of the Sabre pilots.
Assessment
Air-to-air combat in Korea was different than in World War 11. Jet fighters
approached, engaged, and disengaged at much higher speeds. Firing
opportunities were brief and fleeting. Neither the MiG nor the Sabre (but
especially the MiG) had armament or gunsight suited to this cascading,
turbulent form of combat. As a result, losses on both sides were lower,
given the number of aircraft which sortied, than during comparable battles
in World War II.Il3 Veteran Sabre pilots described brief engagements, and
gave a lot of the credit for “kills” to a pilot’s position in an attack formation
(which depended on seniority) or to a pilot’s ability to sneak shots at
MiGs which had already reached the official exclusion zone near the
Yalu.Il4 On the other hand, Korea did demonstrate the superiority of highperformance
jets over the best of the propeller-driven aircraft from World
War 11, including bombers such as the B-29. However, Korea also showed
that-as in World Wars I and 11-tactical training, especially at the front,
was essential to tactical success. Sabre squadrons in Korea used gun camera
films, analysis by intelligence officers of MiG tactics, and plenty of
training flights to prepare for combat. The greatest enemy of Sabre
effectiveness was the poor quality of Korean airfields, which were too
short, too dirty, inadequately defended, and lacking in proper maintenance
and storage facilities. These were problems the USAF never
completely solved.II5
The USAF’s air superiority campaign in Korea was a success. The
brunt of the campaign was carried by FEAF bombers and Fifth Air Force
fighters, but other aircraft-from Navy fighters to Fifth Air Force light
bombers-assisted the B-29s in closing North Korean airfields. Moreover,
there was a close and positive relationship between reconnaissance and
fighter-interceptor squadrons. Without reconnaissance, FEAF could not
allocate its B-29s among the most significant targets or know how much the
B-29s accomplished. Without the Sabre screens, however, the reconnaissance
aircraft could not survive their patrols. Finally, without coordination
between Fifth Air Force and FEAF, the air superiority campaign would
496