Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
military actions accordingly. In the air, this meant abandoning the most
fundamental axiom of air superiority, first expounded by the Italian
prophet, Giulio Douhet, that “it is easier and more effective to destroy the
enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than
to hunt his flying birds in the air.”I9 In Operation KADESH the task assigned
to the IAF was simply “to support the ground forces and be prepared to
counter enemy interference.”20 In an order analogous to the “Yalu River
rule” of the Korean War, Israeli pilots were ordered to stay at least ten
miles from the canal, even though all but one of the Egyptian airfields lay
west of it. Although the appropriate contingency plans existed,21 there
would be no attempt to establish air superiority through a preemptive strike
against the Egyptian Air Force [EAFI on the ground: that would be left to
their British and French allies.
The IAF was outnumbered on paper by the EAF alone, all of whose
combat aircraft were jets, and if the aircraft of Egypt’s allies should become
involved the apparent odds would become prohibitive. However, the picture
was not as difficult as it appeared. In theory, the Egyptians could call
on 156 combat machines, but only 84 of them (30 MiG-15s, 30 de Havilland
Vampires, 12 Gloster Meteors, and 12 11-28 light bombers) were operationa1.22
The Israelis mustered 136 operational aircraft, of which 53 (16
Dassault Mystere IV As, 22 Dassault Ouragans, and 15 Meteors) were
jets.23 Only the Mysteres were seen as comparable to the MiG-15s
although, as events were to show, the Ouragans, in the hands of superior
pilots, were quite capable of matching them.
However, at the time it all seemed a great risk. “By the Air Staff’s
reckoning,” wrote the noted military historian, S. L. A. Marshall, “its main
decision, in conflict with what is elsewhere considered the controlling principle,
came when its forces here committed full-scale to support of the land
battle without first achieving air superiority or inflicting any material damage
on the enemy Air FoTc~s.”~~ One might add, the commitment was made
also without much radar capability; nor were their ground and air headquarters
sited together-a handicap more significant in the realm of close
air support than that of air superiority.25
The Israelis hedged their bets by persuading the French to station temporarily
two interceptor squadrons from their L’Armek de 1’Air on Israeli
soil, assigned to protect Israeli cities from Arab bombers,26 but apparently
they were never needed. High serviceability and phenomenally quick turnarounds
simply confirmed the advantages that superior pilot training and
tactics already gave the Israelis. IAF claimed a sortie rate of better than
four a day for their jets and about two-and-a-half a day for their propellerdriven
machines, while the Egyptians averaged less than one a day even
before the Anglo-French intervention.2’
The first Israeli move was to drop a paratroop force near the Mitla
Pass, about thirty miles east of the canal at 1700 hours on October 29, 1956.
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