Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
efforts of the strategic bombers. Their directive issued to the strategic
bomber forces in mid-April emphasized that point.** Within a few days of
the decision against the Oil Plan, Spaatz approached Eisenhower and
reminded him of the urgent need to continue to inflict heavy attrition on
the Luftwaffe. He said that the only way this could be done was to
attack targets that the Luftwaffe would defend and the best targets for
this purpose were those involved in synthetic oil produ~tion.~~ In effect,
Spaatz now represented the Oil Plan as a continuation of the air superiority
part of POINTBLANK, not as the development of a new strategy. One
source asserts that Spaatz threatened to resign if he were not allowed to
open the oil offensive.84 Whether the threat was made or not, Eisenhower
did agree that Spaatz should make some “experimental” attacks
on oil
The first of these attacks began in early May. On May 5, the Fifteenth
Air Force bombed the crude oil refineries in Romania; on the 12th, Eighth
Air Force struck the first blows at German synthetic petroleum production.
The Eighth hit those targets again on the 28th and 29th of May. These
attacks caused a formidable reaction from the German defenses and
inflicted considerable attrition on the enemy. That, of course, helped to
hold down frontline strength and to continue the exchange of experienced
German pilots for poorly trained ones. It does not appear, however, that
Luftwaffe operations were made to suffer significantly from fuel and lubricant
shortages in May or June of 1944. These seem to have had their greatest
impact beginning sometime in late August.
To understand this, it is necessary to look first at the relation between
aviation gasoline consumption and production.86 (See Figure 6-5) Consumption
rose each month between January and May of 1944. In January,
it stood at 122,000 metric tons. Rising to 156,000 tons in March, it peaked
at 195,000 tons in May. In June, it fell, but only to 182,000 tons. It fell again
in July, to a figure roughly equal to the level consumed in February. After
July, however, the decline was steeper, to 115,000 tons in August, and then
down to a mere 60,000 in September.
Aviation gasoline production shows a somewhat different picture. It expanded
in the first three months of the year, from 159,000 tons in January to
181,000 in March. A slight decline occurred in April, and the May figure stood
at 156,000 tons. The drop in production in June was dramatic, to 52,000 tons.
From there it fell to a mere 10,000 tons in Se~tember.~’
For the first four months of the year, production exceeded consumption,
with the margin narrowing from about 37,000 tons in January to just
over 10,000 in April. This allowed the accumulation of reserve stocks,
which were employed to keep the level of Luftwaffe operations up while
the production of aviation gasoline fell. The deficit in production amounted
to nearly 30,000 tons in May and grew to 130,000 in June. From there on it
narrowed because Luftwaffe operations fell off rapidly.88
296