Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
higher. Would Israeli air superiority have been as great if it had had to fight
for it against substantially larger Arab forces, better controlled and with
their morale relatively intact? Probably not. In war there is an intricate
relationship between quality and quantity (expressed mathematically in the
Lanchester equations and his N-square Law),” which could have altered
the balance significantly had the Arab air forces entered the battle more or
less intact.
Escalation to the War of Attrition
The Israelis held their conquests after the 1967 cease-fire, giving themselves
some “buffer” spaces, deep enough in the south to make a more
orthodox strategy viable, but still relatively shallow on the west bank of
the Jordan and the Golan Heights in the northeast. In the Sinai and on the
Golan they were able to construct radar stations on high ground that significantly
improved their early warning capability, and these were carefully
tied in by landline and radio to the operations center at Tel Aviv.
There was every reason to do so. Their Arab enemies-at least the
Egyptians and the Syrians-were intent on revenge. Armies and air forces
were rebuilt with Russian support, while staff officers plotted new strategies
around new technologies. The most important of these, from an airman’s
point of view, were the development of much more effective surfaceto-air
missiles, a quantum jump in the capability of low-level air defense
artillery, and the integration of the two into a comprehensive air defense
umbrella.
Meanwhile, Arab-Israeli borders were treated to a series of guerrilla
skirmishes which the Egyptians finally escalated into the so-called “War of
Attrition,” involving artillery strikes and commando-type raids on both
sides. The air arms eventually became committed, too, and on July 20,
1969, about forty Egyptian aircraft penetrated into Israeli airspace over the
Sini, strafing and bombing minor military installations. Israeli aircraftprobably
Mirages and Super-Mysteres-rose to greet them. In the ensuing
battle, the Israelis admitted losing two unidentified planes, but claimed to
have downed two Su-7s, two MiG-l7s, and one MiG-21. The Egyptians
had a very different story, claiming nineteen Israeli planes for the loss of
two of their own. They took a more moderate line on September 11 when,
after another major clash, they claimed four victories while admitting two
losses.72 But, as the Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Saad el Shazli, has
remarked, although “frequently our pilots would swear they had shot down
one or more of the enemy. . . . those kills somehow never fell on Egyptian
The Israelis were just beginning to convert to American warplanes.
During the Six-Day War, the French, worried by the possibility of an Arab
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