Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

KOREA
jets met, the approaching formations broke up into two and four-plane
groups. Chinese aircraft that could not maneuver for a shot or support
another formation simply queued up and waited for a chance to
engage. When the Sabre wings received the F-86F, they could for the
first time climb and attack the MiGs “waiting in line.” It must have been
an extremely frustrating experience for the enemy pilots. Yet it was not
unusual or unpredictable. RAF Spitfire pilots had suffered through the
same sort of situation over France in 1941, when having more fighters
than the Luftwaffe had not given them control of the air.Io3 The Sabres
were demonstrating that sheer numerical superiority was not the key factor
to winning air superiority.
What really mattered was the ability of a pilot to maneuver into his
enemy’s “cone of vulnerability,” a three-dimensional space which gradually
expanded from the tail of the fighter under attack to the limit of the attacking
plane’s effective gun range. A Sabre‘s cone of vulnerability was too
small to allow more than one MiG at a time to set up for a shot. A second
MiG attempting to enter the same space at the same time endangered his
own compatriot without significantly increasing the chance of a “kill.” A
MiG trying to get at a Sabre already under attack by another MiG also ran
the risk of quickly becoming a target for the aggressively maneuvering
Sabre. Dogfights tended to break down into one-on-one contests because
of the nature of fighter tactics. In addition, Sabre pilots understood that
gaining the maneuvering initiative was crucial to survival and success.
Therefore, they practiced and refined techniques and maintained an aggressive
spirit that gave them that initiative.
The Chinese Communist Air Force responded to their losses in air-toair
combat by fielding a force of 100 Soviet-made 11-28jet bombers. With a
loaded range of nearly 700 miles, the 11-28 “had a formidable night-attack
potential.”’” The Chinese did not throw these aircraft into battle, but the
threat they posed to U.N. airfields and to USN carrier task forces was
clear. Indeed, from the perspective of Fifth Air Force and FEAF, the air
war was steadily heating up. In the air, Korea was not a stalemate; it was
escalating, and USAF Headquarters was committed to responding to every
aggressive action by the Chinese and North Koreans. Fifth Air Force was
ordered to equip 2 fighter-bomber wings (the 8th and 18th) with F-86Fs
configured for ground attack. The plan was to train both wings in interceptor
and ground attack tactics, so that F-86s could form tactically cohesive
units that could then handle any type (ground or air) of North Korean targets.
The conversion took some months; the last of the 18th Wing’s squadrons
to become operational in the ground-attack Sabres was ready the first
week of April 1953; the corresponding date for the 8th Wing was the first
week of June.Io5 These and other reinforcements gave U.N. air forces the
chance to show the Chinese that the U.N. could dominate any game of
escalation. In fact, the USAF was now given the duty of forcing the
493