Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

OPERATION OVERLORD
system. In fact, from September 1940 right through to the first six months
of 1944, German bombing in the west was dominated by the idea of reprisal
for Bomber Command’s area attacks on German cities. The limited effort
available to the Luftwaffe was largely wasted in attacks on British cities,
chiefly London, supplemented by small scale “tip and run” raids. Such
attacks could not interfere with Allied air operations, significantly damage
British industry, or hinder sea communications.f2
The air superiority over the United Kingdom created by the work of
Fighter Command and augmented by the failures of German policy was
clearly demonstrated between January and June of 1944. The Luftwaffe
had accumulated a small bomber force of some 500 aircraft for operations
in the west. Hitler and Goering determined that this force was not to be
conserved and trained for operations against the forthcoming Allied invasion,
but was to be employed in reprisal raids against London. These raids
were carried out at night, were inaccurate, and suffered an average casualty
rate of six percent of sorties. They damaged or destroyed property and
caused some loss of life, but they did not interfere with preparations for
OVERLORD. The few raids directed against south coast ports were entirely
ineffective.33
Fighter Command (now known by the infelicitous title of Air Defence
of Great Britain or ADGB) was also successful in preventing the Luftwaffe
from carrying out one of its most important tasks-daylight aerial reconnaissance
of the Allied buildup areas. British records show that, between
January and June 1944, Luftfiotte 3 made no more than thirty-two such
flights (exclusive of any over coastal waters). From late April right through
the invasion period, ADGB maintained standing patrols over the key
assembly areas for the Allied fleets. In the same period, the Luftwaffe
intensified its efforts, flying daily reconnaissance sorties. Only two of
these actually made landfall in the Plymouth and Falmouth areas. During
the first week of June 1944, when the Allied armada was collected at the
ports, loaded with troops and equipment, and then marshalled at sea, only
one German daylight reconnaissance sortie, over the Margate area, was
recorded. This form of air superiority directly contributed to the tactical
surprise achieved by British and American forces on D-da~.3~
POINTBLANK: Strategic Bomber Offensive
The Allies set in motion their campaign to gain a general air superiority
over the Luftwaffe at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. The
overall objective of the strategic bomber forces was to aim at the “progressive
destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic
system and the systematic undermining of the morale of the German
people” in order to “fatally” weaken their “capacity for armed resistance.”
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