Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
The next day Spaatz had a talk with General Porter, Fredendall’s chief
of staff, who flatly contradicted his commander when he informed Spaatz
that very few men had been lost to enemy dive bombers, with the exception
of one infantry battalion in trucks that had been caught in the open
by enemy aircraft; and this occurred because of the “stupidity on the
part of the Battalion Commander.” According to Spaatz’s account of the
meeting, “Porter was emphatically of the opinion that ground troops in
forward positions should be able to take care of themselves and would
be as soon as they learned to open fire instead of taking cover, kept
proper dispersion, and were given sufficient antiaircraft weapons.”
Further, Porter thought that “a defensive fear complex was being built up
in the 2nd Corps. . . .”37
As noted above, Spaatz, Fredendall, Kuter, McNabb, and Anderson
were engaged in the classic conflict between ground and air officers over
the proper use of aircraft in combat. Most ground commanders in Tunisia
saw aircraft as having essentially two missions: namely to protect ground
forces from air attack, which was to be done by maintaining “air umbrellas”
over ground positions, and to act as airborne artillery to attack targets
directly in front of the ground forces. Air force officers, however, saw aircraft
not as a defensive weapon or artillery piece, but rather as an offensive
weapon of great flexibility, which was capable after gaining air superiority
of hitting at the center of an enemy’s military power. In 1943, the whole
problem was made even more complex because the AAF, while being semiindependent,
was still a part of the U.S. Army. Consequently, high-ranking
U.S. Army ground force officers thought they should have the right to order
a squadron of fighters around in much the same way as they could a tank
battalion.
Before the Allies could come to any consensus on tactics and command,
the Germans mounted a major attack on the US. I1 Corps on February
14. Rommel’s army had withdrawn behind the Mareth Line in Tunisia
by the beginning of February, and the Axis had decided to strengthen its
position in Tunisia by attacking the southern flank of the Allied forces advancing
from the west before the British Eighth Army in the east could
renew its offensive against Rommel. Two weeks later, German armor, supported
by aircraft, attacked the American 1st Armored Division between
Faid and Gafsa. A large tank battle ensued in the Sidi Bou Zid region in
which the Americans were defeated, losing about half their tanks. By midnight
February 17/18, the enemy had advanced to the line, Pichon-Sleitla-
Kasserine-Thelpte. To stop the Axis advance, the Allies threw all their
reserves into the battle. By February 25 the crisis was over, and the enemy
was slowly falling back eastwards with their offensive having been halted
mainly by Allied artillery fire. Allied air power played a minor role in stopping
the enemy in the battle at Kasserine Pass because of bad weather and
the loss of airfields in the Sbeita, Gafsa, Thelept, and Tebessa regions. The
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