Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
20, escort carrier Long Island launched nineteen Marine Corps F4Fs
and twelve Marine SBDs that landed at Henderson Field. Two days later
part of the AAF 67th Fighter Squadron arrived with P-400s (export
versions of the P-39). A complement of Naval SBDs from the Enrerprise
landed on August 24, and nineteen more F4Fs and twelve more SBDs
came in before the end of August. This was not enough. The aircraft that
arrived on the 20th were in action the next day. Combat losses were surprisingly
low in view of the amount of flying done. American pilots
claimed five or six Japanese planes for each American plane shot down,
and operations went on steadily day after day. Furthermore, many planes
were lost in takeoff or landing accidents on the primitive airfield, and some
were destroyed by the Japanese bombing attacks. The P-400~ proved
practically useless in air combat and were relegated to supporting ground
troops. l4
The pilots defending Guadalcanal had some help. Aircraft carriers
joined in the fight at crucial moments, but this could be only at times of
crisis. Not until Luzon in 1945 would the United States have enough carriers
and the Japanese air force be weak enough, for these precious ships
to remain in combat for more than a few days at a time. As it was, two of
the three carriers in the South Pacific in August of 1942 were lost before the
Battle of Guadalcanal was over, and Enterprise, the survivor, was badly
damaged. B-17s based at Espiritu Santo performed valuable reconnaissance
and, eventually, by staging through Henderson Field, were able to
strike at Japanese bases in the northern Solomons, even though they were
weak blows. Navy PBYs (Catalinas) also performed valuable reconnaissance
and now and then delivered bombs-and once torpedos-at shipping
targets. Southwest Pacific bombers struck at Rabaul from Port Moresby,
but these too were relatively weak attacks. Yet, in a fight so close as Guadalcanal
any help was much to be de~ired.'~
Also to the advantage of Henderson Field's aerial defenders was the
great distance the attacking Japanese aircraft had to fly. This meant that
planes coming from Rabaul had to arrive near the middle of the day or later,
so there was some respite in the mornings and afternoons. Early warning
radar, not so efficient in 1942 as it would be later in the war, enabled work
on the airfield to continue until shortly before Japanese bombs began to
fall. Almost certainly, however, the greatest blessing for the defenders of
Henderson Field was the fact that the Australians, in evacuating the Solomons,
had left behind coastwatchers. These brave men gave warning of
Japanese attacks long before (sometimes almost an hour) the bombers
arrived overhead. The advance notice gave the hard-pressed F4Fs time to
get to altitude from which they could strike the Japanese bombers and fighters
from above. The advantage of altitude did much to make up for the
Wildcats' disadvantages. '6
The survival of American air power on Guadalcanal, in the final analy-
334