Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LESSONS BEFORE WORLD WAR I1
objective should remain the enemy homefront. Trenchard saw nothing
wrong in bombing cities as long as the targets remained military ones.
Civilian workers in war industries remained legitimate targets since he
foresaw a “moral” effect of creating panic among them and dispersing their
contribution to the war effort.”
Douhet’s theories received wider scrutiny, largely because of his
numerous publications. His pivotal work, I1 Dominio Dell’Aria (The Command
ofthe Air) appeared in 1921. Its theme applied equally to a continental
nation such as Italy, as well as to maritime powers like Great Britain.
The book especially appealed to younger aviators committed to Douhet’s
dictum that “the control of the air allows us to stop the enemy from flying
and to keep his faculty for ourselves.” Moreover, Douhet looked beyond
the limits of a land battlefield. Underlying his theories were twin assumptions
that 1) aircraft are instruments of offense against which no effective
defense can be foreseen; and 2) civilian morale can be shattered by bombardment
of population centers. Douhet’s main tenets and scenarios for
future war flowed from these assumptions.*”
Douhet stated bluntly that to insure an adequate national defense, it
was necessary to be in a position to “conquer” the command of the air in
the event of war. Like Trenchard, he saw the primary objectives of an aerial
attack as industrial and population centers. He rejected the idea that an
enemy air force should be fought in the air, but rather “by destroying the
collection points, the supplying and the manufacturing centers of the
enemy aviation.” Like the RAF chief, Douhet thought that the role of armies
should be purely defensive, containing an enemy advance while the
strategic aerial offensive proceeded with the destruction of the enemy’s
warmaking capability and morale. He also rejected the notion of specialized
fighters to defend against enemy bombers, preferring instead to devote
all air resources to “battle planes” which would carry out bombardment,
and yet would also be self-defending. Inherent survivability of such aircraft
would obviate the need for friendly pursuit escort, since they would always
get through and thus prevent the enemy from ever mounting its own air
offensive. As another prominent French soldier of the era, Marshal Henri
PCtain suggested, Douhet provided “an inexhaustible source for
reflection.”2l
Douhet and Trenchard ultimately proved far less controversial than
Mitchell. As Assistant Chief of the Air Service in the United States Army,
this zealous crusader gathered around him a coterie of American airpower
enthusiasts. However, his major problem was the questioning of War
Department authority to make air policy. The issue became highly politicized
as Army staff officers studied various peacetime reorganization
schemes and rejected any thought that an air service should exist separate
from the ground forces. For a time, even Mitchell embraced that position.
However, his thinking gradually changed between the end of the war and
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