Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
meaningfully, 40 percent of all losses throughout the war or 14 percent of
the frontline combat strength of the 1AF.”l14
In the south the Egyptians were more disciplined (although probably
no less effective) in their expenditure of missiles. However, on the Golan
Heights and along the road to Damascus the Syrians launched salvo after
salvo at Israeli aircraft buzzing like wasps overhead until, “by noon on
Monday they stopped shooting. We did some experiments. No more missile~.”~~~
The Syrians had used up all their stocks.
The Russians began to airlift replacement missiles to Syria, and the
IAF turned briefly from close support to interdiction, bombing the airfield
that the Russians were using. “They switched to another airfield
and we bombed the second one. The first attack on the second base
occurred when a Russian transport was on the ground already, and got hit
there,” reports General Hod. “We stopped the airlift for another 24 hours
and by Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning the situation had
changed.”Il6
The Egyptians, established on the east bank of the canal, seemed content
to hold their ground under the protection of an unbroken missile
umbrella. The Israeli Bar-Lev strongholds soon fell, and once they were
lost there was no immediate requirement for air power in support of the
ground forces since the Egyptians were still far short of the Israeli border.
On the Golan, it was different. Although the Syrian offensive had been
stopped and the attackers driven back to the old ceasefire line, the enemy
was still very close to Israeli settlements. At the moment the Syrians had
few, if any, missiles, and their air defenses were off balance. But the IAF
was hurting, too. “Despite its heavy losses, the force will still be able to
pack a considerable wallop in the north tomorrow, and in the south the day
after,” wrote Bartov. “But if another four to five days of erosion are
allowed to pass before the counter-attack commences, the air force may
reach its ‘red line.’ ”117
Already it was clear that the IAF could not always give the ground forces
that degree of support they were accustomed to when operating within reach
of intact enemy missile screens.l18 References to the imminence of a “red
line” suggest that Zuhul was, by the loth, at least considering the possibility
that attrition would compel the Air Force to give up all offensive action in
support of a ground offensive, saving its machines simply to protect Israeli
airspace and drive off any Arab aircraft which attempted to attack Israeli
troops. The Army, now that it was fully mobilized, could certainly hold off the
enemy without help of air power, but whether it could advance successfully
over any distance without air support and still avoid incurring excessive casualties
was a questionable matter. And if it could not, the Israelis would be
forced to choose between a short war and unbearable casualties on the one
hand, or a long conflict and disastrous socio-economic attrition on the home
front, on the other.
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