Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

NORTHWEST AFRICA
Allied Air Support Command flew what sorties it could in the face of inclement
weather and the enemy’s air force. But during the period February
14-22, at the height of the battle for Kasserine Pass, the Allies flew only an
average of about 365 sorties a day of all kinds, excluding antishipping missions,
in all of Northwest Afri~a.3~ The author of a RAF staff history fairly
set forth the role of air power during the enemy offensive at Kasserine
when he wrote that “it is apparent that air action in the Kasserine battle
was not decisive.”39
In the aftermath of the Kasserine battle, even though the Axis air
forces had played a relatively small role in the engagement, there were a
number of reactions to the performance of the Allied air forces. One of the
more rational ones was Doolittle’s, who thought that all major operations
should be stopped and that the Allied strategic and tactical air forces undertake
“a short, intense, planned, combined effort” to destroy the enemy air
forces in Tunisia.*O Prime Minister Churchill’s bitter evaluation, however,
was typical of many reactions among the Allies: “The outstanding fact at
the moment is our total failure to build up air superiority in Tunisia. . . .’’*I
By this point, the airmen themselves began to see the education of land
generals beginning to bear fruit. Perhaps Kasserine galvanized top commanders
to take action; perhaps it was the fact that the merging of Western
Desert and Northwest African operations permitted the superior British
doctrinal approaches to become inculcated into American circles. Montgomery
and Coningham had started the process with a “lessons learned”
conference at Tripoli on February 16, a conference which received “a gospel
according to Montgomery” (as Tedder phrased it), in which the British
general flatly told the assembled American and British officers that “any
officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly
certain basic principles regarding the use of air power.”** The words were
Montgomery’s; the ideas those of Coningham. Since the great value of air
power is its “flexibility,” said Montgomery, there is the capability of making
mass attacks on one target and then conducting mass attacks on a completely
different type of target. It was clear that air operations had to be
carefully planned in conjunction with those on the ground (not merely
directed by ground authorities), so that the full weight of mass air attack
could be placed on targets of greatest importance at any particular time. If
aircraft were commanded by ground force leaders, air power would lose its
flexibility, and would not be able to conduct such mass attacks. To obtain
the greatest possible assistance from an air force, both air and ground commanders
had to not only plan the battle together, but both staffs had to
work to insure implementation of these plans, and the two staffs should be
colocated to facilitate ease of communications. In Montgomery’s words:
The commander of an army in the field should have an Air H.Q. with him which will
have direct control and command of such squadrons as may be allotted for operations
in support of his army.
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