Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LESSONS BEFORE WORLD WAR I1
and performing air reconnaissance. The air superiority mission remained
paramount. 47
While the theories of Douhet never captivated Soviet leadership, brief
flirtations with strategic bombardment enamored Soviet theorist A. N.
Lapchinsky in the 1920s and resulted in construction of the world’s largest
four-engine bomber force in the early and mid-1930s. But the Spanish Civil
War discredited strategic bombardment as an effective weapon in Soviet
minds and reaffirmed the more traditional emphasis on tactical air operations.
For the most part, Soviet authorities faced three principal problems
in building air power after the revolution: construction of aircraft plants,
recruitment of pilots from the newly liberated Russian proletariat, and
research and development of engines and airframes.48
At first, the majority of Soviet aircraft came from foreign sources,
either abandoned or captured during foreign interventions at the end of the
World War, or purchased in the West. Special arrangements with postwar
German leaders for research and development yielded promising results.
Yet, servicing the resultant menagerie of aircraft proved to be a problem
for Soviet air officials. This stimulated a long period of work toward selfsufficiency.
By 1930, Soviet aviation included respected models like the allmetal
Tupolev ANT-3 reconnaissance plane, various models of general
purpose R-5 aircraft, Polikarpov 1-3, 1-4, and later, 1-15 and 1-16 models
of fighter aircraft, and the long-range Tupolov TB-I and TB-3, and the
SB-2 bombardment planes. In the official Soviet propaganda view: “In the
years of the prewar five-year plans a powerful aircraft industry was created
in the Soviet Union thanks to the unstinting efforts of the Party, the government
and all the people.”49
As the future Soviet Marshall Georgii Zhukov noted in his memoirs:
“In two years implementation of an organizational plan for the Red Army’s
air force began in which tactical, operational, and strategic problems were
considered from the viewpoint of national defense in the event of aggression.”
Still, the Soviet Union experienced severe setbacks during the dictatorship
of Premier Josef Stalin. While figures vary, among millions of
Russians sent to prison or execution chambers at least 35,000 officers of
the armed forces lost their lives, including 3 successive chiefs of staff of the
VVS and a large part of the air arm’s junior officers in 1938-39 alone. Moreover,
the purges removed the cream of senior military, political, scientific,
and administrative leaders in the country. Predictably, replacements were
younger and inexperienced but loyal followers of Stalin. This loss of talent
and professional expertise definitely affected the Soviet Union’s ability to
wage war. Conformity replaced ingenuity. If earlier Soviet military leadership
had come close to resolving technical problems of the VVS through
modernized equipment and provision of an industrial base, the new Soviet
leaders lost that sharp edge so necessary for doctrinal development and
implementation. Political intimidation sapped the strength of military lead-
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