Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

WAR AGAINST JAPAN
military commanders in Tokyo on July 16, 1945, for allowing enemy task
forces to dominate the area around the homeland.lo5
At some point, the Japanese High Command had to face up to the consequences
of having abdicated the battle for air superiority over the homeland.
In June 1945, Japan was struck 36 times by an aggregate of about
4,600 USAAF, USN, and USMC planes of all types operating from the Marianas,
Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and aircraft carriers. Arguments raged between
Japanese staff officers, who insisted that all of the country’s cities should
not be allowed to die, and those who responded that it was impossible to
defend the whole nation, lest the remaining fighter assets be expended even
before the enemy’s ground invasion began. In late June, IGHQ finally
decided to adopt an air defense policy of engaging enemy planes. Even so,
Japanese interceptors were only to go after bombers, because they were
deemed to be most dangerous to the country as a whole, and because Japanese
fighters could be expected to suffer far fewer losses in combat against
bombers than against fighters. Enemy fighters should be engaged only
when circumstances were “especially advantageous or absolutely necessary.”
It was not thought that this selective type of air defense would prevent
the weakening of the people’s will to resist, but it was hoped that even
local successes by the Japanese air forces would exert favorable psychological
effects on the populace and concomitantly adverse effects on the
resolve of the enemy.IM
On July 9, 1945, the three air divisions defending Japan were transferred
from the jurisdiction of the ground armies and placed under the
direct control of the Air General Army. Although that force was directed to
cooperate closely with the Navy, the Army was explicitly given responsibility
for the overall air defense of the country. IJAAF staff officers admit
that the latest steps merely amounted to another paper plan, and that the
air divisions were unable to concern themselves with the interception
of raiding aircraft, but had to conserve what was left of their strength
for the decisive last battle against land invasion. Given the Japanese
emphasis on kamikazes in 1945, few fighters were left to handle the
conventional air defense role. The 10th Air Division at Tokyo, for example,
had only ninety-five serviceable IJAAF interceptors in five air groups as
of late July.’07
To cover the Osaka-Kobe and Nagoya districts, the 1 lth Air Division
assembled several dozen Type 3 Hien (TONY) and Type 4 Hayate (FRANK)
fighters at Kameoka, west of Kyoto. Learning on July 19 that a B-29 raid
impended, 1 lth Air Division Headquarters at Osaka ordered interception
at full strength. Too late, the division heard that the enemy raiders had been
identified as fighter aircraft, and the Japanese interceptors were ordered
to avoid contact. The radioed messages never got through to the
IJAAF fighter units. The 16 TONYS of the 56th Air Group, patrolling at
14,000 feet, were surprised by a like number of P-51s operating 5,000 feet
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