Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

NORTHWEST AFRICA
about by sending up flights of few planes in attacks on gun positions and on
patrol over troops and [no] protection of P-39s and A-20s when it was
known that they would meet enemy aircraft in superior numbers.”35 He
next told Spaatz that P-40 fighters should only be used when they enjoyed
a three-to-one superiority over opposing enemy aircraft. In this respect,
Cochran was thinking in terms of concentration of force at the point of
contact with the enemy.
Part of the task of airmen like Spaatz was one of educating ground
leaders. After breakfast on February 5, he went to Anderson’s headquarters
at Tebessa. Although the British general was not there, Spaatz discussed
a number of problems with Kuter and Anderson’s chief of staff,
Brigadier V. C. McNabb. McNabb told Spaatz that the U.S. I1 Corps had
recently lost “seven hundred men from attacks of dive bombers,” and that
Anderson “wanted the whole air effort put on ground positions immediately
in front of our troops in the coming offensive.” At this point, Kuter
noted that Anderson had told him on the previous day that support of
Allied forces was the main task of the air forces and that he, Anderson,
“was not interested in the bombing of enemy airdromes such as that at
Gabes.” The discussion ended with McNabb saying that he “hardly
thought” that Anderson “had intended to go that far.”
After lunch Kuter and Spaatz went to the headquarters of the U.S. I1
Corps and discussed problems with Fredendall concerning air support of
ground forces. Fredendall wanted aircraft flying over his forces for 48 hours
from the beginning of an attack to protect his men and artillery from being
dive-bombed. In addition, Fredendall “wanted his men to see some bombs
dropped on the position immediately in front of them, and if possible, some
dive bombers brought down in sight of his troops so that their morale would
be bolstered.” The American corps commander ended by saying that he
had lost 300 men to dive bombers. Spaatz pointed out that he had not only
already “worn out” 2 fighter groups and a light bomber squadron giving air
support to ground forces but he could not continue such operations, for
“the rate of replacement would not allow extravagant dissipation of available
air force.” He continued to say that “he wanted to give all the help
that he could,” but that correct employment of air power was to hit enemy
“soft points” such as airfields, tank parks, motor pools, and troop convoys.
Spaatz also told Fredendall “that if he maintained a constant ’umbrella’
over one small section of the front with only shallow penetrations by bombers
and fighters, that his available force would be dissipated without any
lasting effect.” Spaatz thought “that the hard core of any army should be
able to take care of itself when it came to dive bombers.” Fredendall then
remarked that he had lost 2 batteries of artillery to dive bombers and that
without direct air support he could not go on to the offensive. After repeating
to Fredendall what he thought was the proper employment of aircraft,
Spaatz left the U.S. I1 Corps headquarters.36
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