Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
reports of the order of battle in the Public Record Office in AIR 201 835.64700: the daily
returns of the Equipment Branch in AIR 161943-945; and the returns on personnel (AIR 201
2037) and production (AIR 22/293.64819). Combat reports are in AIR S0/2. Richards and
Saunders. The Royal Air Force. and Winston Churchill. Their Finest Hoctr (Boston. 1949)
contain statistics and comments on production and pilots, as does also Sir Maurice Dean’s
The Royal Air Force and Two World Wurs.
45. Collier, The Defence ofihe United Kingdom, p 112, notes the overestimate of the
Luftwaffe: F. M. Hinsley in British Intelligence in the Second World Wur, vol 1 (Cambridge,
1979 to present), p 299. provides an account of the problem, its continued impact into early
1941, and its resolution with Justice Singleton’s inquiry and report. Mason. The Battle Over
Britain. p 128. See also Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Vol VI: 1919-1941 (London,
1983). p 479.
46. AIR41/8.79031. p7S.
47. AIR 4118.7944. p 139.
48. AIR 4118.80363, p 169. and AIR4118.79231. p 10.
49. lan Colvin. None So Blind (London. 1965). p 138, quoting Viscount Swinton. Secretary
of State for Air. 1935-1938.
50. Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime (Hamden. Conn., 1963). p 207. The 225
percent figure used here was developed just prior to World War 11 in Scheme M for more
modern aircraft and seems more reasonable to use than the 96 reserve aircraft per squadron
of 16 quoted earlier which was probably based upon World War I wastage rates.
51. For production, AIR 22/293.2.64819. According to this source and as quoted in
Mason, The Battle Over Britain, p 59. the figures are as given. However. my chart is compiled
from AIR 1011835.64700. No. 41 Group’s records. and it gives a rather different picture.
52. F. J. Adkin. From the Ground Up (Shrewsbury, 1983). pp 199-200. By custom each
machine had a fitter and a rigger and they did all the work up to major inspections. But war
showed this to be impossible. Fighter squadrons were the last to go over to the “garage”
system.
53. AIR 16/943,94,945.
54. AIR 16/1037.R 2504.
55. Professor Frank Tillman, Head, Department of Industrial Engineering, Kansas State
University.
56. S. C. Rexford-Welch. Roval Air Force Medical Services, vol I1 (London. 1954). pp
177-82. See also Samuel A. Stouffer, et ul., Studies in Sociuf Psychologv In World Wur I /
(Princeton, 1949). 4 vols.
57. See Mason, The Battle Over Britain. for Sept 8. A number of the public saw only the
wild off-duty side of fighter pilots, and others had no way of telling that young men in blue
uniforms were the elite defenders who had an hour or so before been fighting over their very
heads. Too often it looked too pretty for war compared to the Army.
58. R.D.F. (Radio Direction Finding) was the decoy code name used to disguise early
radar. See R. V. Jones, The Wizard Wur (New York. 1978).
59. The revolution in mechanization of construction was just around the corner, but
bulldozers, trenchers, and the like were not yet available. Most such work was done by hand
or by a slow steam shovel which was too big for laying deep landlines.
60. Orange, Park, p 103.
61. G. E. Wallace, The Guns of the Roval Air Force, 1939-45 (London. 1972). pp 30-37,
54-68.77-99.
62. Orange, Park, pp 75-81,
63. AVM Peter Wykeham. Fighter Command: A Stitdv in Air Defence. 1914-1960 (London,
1960). One of the curses of interwar procurement was that as few as one squadron of a
type was bought. which meant lack of standardization. Moreover, as in the army regiment so
in the RAF squadron, it was the unit that did the bulk of the training of its officers and
airmen.
64. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strutegic Air Offensive Against Germany,
vol I (London, 1961): Robert Wright. The Mun Who Won the Battle ofBrituin (London,
1969). pp 68,94: and Orange, Park, pp 75.78. 81.
65. Churchill, Their Finest Hour. p 457.
66. Mason, The Battle Over Britain. p 212.
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