Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
achieved, and in dealing with kamikazes nothing else would do. This essential
achievement had required the utmost effort by the AAF and the Navy
air arm, with an assist from the
Lessons Learned
By the end of the battle for the control of the air over Hollandia, certain
general principles applicable to the attainment of air superiority in the
South and Southwest Pacific had become evident. The first essential was a
force of adequate fighter aircraft with well-trained and experienced pilots.
Without this, no air base could be established and maintained within range
of enemy air. An adequate flow of replacement planes and replacement personnel
was critical because combat losses and operational losses were inevitable.
If these fighter planes were to defend their bases, they must have
early warning of enemy attacks. In the early phases of war in New Guinea
and in the Solomons, such warning was provided by coastwatchers. Later,
radar provided this vital service.
Somewhere over the horizon were the main base or bases from which
enemy air action stemmed. In 1942, this was Rabaul for Allied forces in
both New Guinea and the Solomons, and Rabaul continued to be the main
base of operations against South Pacific forces until it was finally neutralized.
But in New Guinea, by mid-1943 Wewak had come at least to rival
Rabaul in importance and by the end of the year had come to exceed it.
While South Pacific forces completed the neutralization of Rabaul, aided
certainly by the losses the Japanese suffered opposing Southwest Pacific
operations in New Guinea and New Britain, Southwest Pacific forces could
devote more attention to Wewak. When Wewak was disposed of, attention
could be switched quickly to Hollandia.
In order to attack the main enemy base, Allied air power had to be able
to reach it. Normally this was no problem for heavy bombers-B-17s and
B-24sbut the Allies originally had no fighters with the range to escort
heavy bombers on long daylight missions, and experience soon demonstrated
that bombers could not operate in daylight over well-defended
bases without fighter escort. Therefore, the heavy bombers either attacked
the main enemy base at night, or they bombed nearer, intermediate bases
to which they could be escorted in daylight. To bring the main enemy bases
within daylight range it was necessary either to secure airfields closer to
the enemy stronghold or to extend the range of fighters and light and
medium bombers.
In practice both were done. The seizure of the Dobodura area on the
north coast of Papua brought Rabaul within range of Fifth Air Force B-25s
and made it possible, though barely, for P-38s to escort bombers to Rabaul.
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