Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

NORTHWEST AFRICA
command, and control of aircraft deployed in support of British forces
should they return to the European continent. At various times, the RAF
established units, such as the Army Cooperation Command, to furnish
direct air support to ground operations. But these units never were very
strong because Bomber, Coastal, and Fighter Commands claimed priority
on men and equipment, especially during the Battle of Britain in 1940.
Furthermore, like senior counterparts in the U.S. Army Air Forces, RAF
commanders thought that victory could best be achieved by strategic bombardment
of Germany, thereby making support of ground forces quite academic.
The Air Ministry took the position that when and if the British
Army ever took to the field in Northwest Europe again, then the RAF
would assign aircraft to support it from Bomber, Coastal, and Fighter Commands.
Naturally, the soldiers took a different approach, believing firmly
that unless the Army controlled the ground support aircraft, the RAF
would most likely withdraw them for other missions.5
The controversy had not been resolved when the RAF’s Eastern Air
Command began operations in Northwest Africa. Furthermore, the command’s
leadership had at best only fragmentary knowledge of the experiences
of the Western Desert Air Force in Egypt because it was simply too
soon for transmittal of “lessons learned” back to staff and training commands
in Great Britain. Thus, at the beginning of this pivotal Northwest
Africa campaign, the RAF units on the scene had little doctrine or training
for supporting ground forces and did not know what kind of relations to
develop with the Twelfth Air Force and Allied ground forces.
Operational Issues during the Race for Tunisia
The invasion of Northwest Africa (Operation TORCH) found no less
than five separate air elements providing cover for the initial landings. Still,
two primary components committed to the operation were the U.S. Twelfth
Air Force (1,244 aircraft) and the RAF Eastern Air Command (454 aircraft).
Allied planners anticipated no problem in gaining air superiority
over French air units stationed in the Vichy French colonies, and it was
hoped that diplomacy might eliminate any resistance to Anglo-American
landings. Under the leadership of Brig. Gen. John K. Cannon, XI1 Air Support
Command accompanied the Western Task Force to Casablanca. The
remainder of the Twelfth Air Force under Maj. Gen. James Doolittle operated
with the Central Task Force at Oran, and the RAF Eastern Air Command
led by Air Marshal William Welsh supported the Eastern Task Force
at Algiers. Both the American and British air contingents reported to
Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied Commander in Chief, Northwest
Africa. (See Figure 5-1) In addition, U.S. carrier-based naval air and the
British Fleet Air Arm covered the landings.
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