Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHEAST ASIA
war, accepted the position that a “graduated response” to a deteriorating
military and political situation in South Vietnam would allow them the
chance to gain their objectives (independence of the South and deterrence
of the People’s Republic of China) without severely straining the military
resources of the United States. They were supported in this position by the
senior theater military commander, Adm. U. S. G. Sharp, Commander in
Chief, Pacific. Sharp’s position, communicated in February 1965 to the Secretary
of Defense, was that “I would hope that we. . . will act. . . in terms
of a ‘graduated pressures’ philosophy which has more of a connotation of
steady, relentless movement. . ..
Sharp emphasized that “any political
program.. .for reaching agreement on cessation of a graduated military
pressures program, will be successful in proportion to the effectiveness of
the military pressures program itself.”6 In short, a display of force was not
sufficient to achieve the goals of the administration of President Lyndon
Johnson. The bombing of North Vietnam’s roads, railroads, and bridges,
however, would be both a signal to the North Vietnamese and a threat to
their ability to support insurgent forces in the South. A bombing campaign
carried on by the United States would show intent and commitment and
achieve the goal of isolating the Viet Cong. Bombing could also be started
and stopped with a word from Washington, depending upon the course of
negotiations between the U.S. and North Vietnam.
The Pentagon Papers show that the bombing of North Vietnam was
advocated early and promoted frequently by the Joint Chiefs during the
crucial year of 1964, when, at President Johnson’s request, the Department
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, and the leaders
of the U.S. effort in South Vietnam tried to develop a policy that would
save South Vietnam at a cost acceptable to the United States. However,
the Pentagon Papers also reveal that the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of
Defense eventually came to disagree strongly over the proper level of the
bombing campaign necessary to achieve U.S. objectives. As Admiral Sharp
had argued, the “graduated pressures” program had to be effective in order
to push the North Vietnamese to an agreement that the United States
favored. But “effective” meant one thing to Sharp and something very different
to the President and his advisers in Washington. On July 1, 1965, for
example, the Secretary of Defense prepared a draft memorandum for the
President in which he advocated mining Haiphong harbor, attacking North
Vietnam’s road and rail bridges to China, and destroying North Vietnam’s
MiG airfields and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.’ The Joint Chiefs supported
this position.
By the end of the month, however, the Secretary of Defense had
changed his views, and, by September 1965, the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary
were locked in conflict, with the Chiefs steadily pressing for an
enlarged air war and the Secretary-with the support of the Presidentonly
slowly and reluctantly allowing USAF and USN aircraft to strike more
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