Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

BATTLE OF BRITAIN
up assuming no financial limitations, had envisaged a German attack by
1,700 bombers in March 1938. To defend against this, the scheme called for
the number of searchlights to be increased from 2,547 to 4,500, and the gun
defense increased to a 16-gun density over sensitive points and 4 guns elsewhere.
What was needed were modern 3.7-inch and 4.5-inch heavy guns,
and these were just becoming available in mid-1938. In addition, the Air
Ministry, which had taken the attitude that the defense of airfields could be
adequately accomplished by .303 or perhaps .5-inch machineguns, suddenly
decided that it wanted 40-mm Bofors at a time when the Army was
competing for them.
It was really the political fall-out resulting from the obvious lack of
preparedness of the country that caused the Cabinet early in November
1938 to approve what was virtually the whole of the Ideal Scheme. By the
spring of 1939 the War Office was demanding seventy-two-gun densities
over vulnerable points. And on July 18, 1939, Pile was appointed to lead
Antiaircraft Command, whose headquarters were adjacent to Dowding’s
Fighter Command headquarters at Stanmore. By the outbreak of hostilities,
Pile’s command had reached its full scale of seven divisions, though
not by any means its full establishment of materiel nor even a fully-trained
status. At the end of June 1940 the Antiaircraft Command was stiffened
with gunners from the BEF, which was home from France (although they
had lost all their guns and equipment). As the battle progressed, the
increase in numbers proved to be a great asset, especially in the southeast
corner around Dover, where the antiaircraft defenses had to be manned
round-the clock, requiring a full double complement for the guns on a shift
basis.
By the end of June 1940 the RAF and Antiaircraft Command were
recovering from the losses in France. The campaigns had been too swift
and the circumstances were regarded as too unusual to have much impact
upon the way the Battle of Britain was fought. What was important was
that the top leaders at Stanmore and at Uxbridge were experienced commanders
who had both fought in the First World War and who had spent
considerable time in the interwar years becoming specialists in their field.
What they desperately needed was time.
Neither Fighter Command nor Antiaircraft Command was fully
equipped with modern weapons. In terms of the actual numbers of
single-seat first-line fighters, the RAF was about equally matched with
the Luftwaffe, although it did not think so. Antiaircraft Command
was still badly under-equipped, plagued with shortages of guns, electric
predictors, and radar. Much of the entire defensive system was highly
vulnerable, having been hastily laid down under peacetime budgetary
restrictions.
167