Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
It was the responsibility of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-
Mallory, the Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces,
to ensure local air superiority on the day of the invasion. He had three
major forces at his disposal-the American Ninth Air Force, the RAF 2d
Tactical Air Force and the Air Defense of Great Britain (ADGB, which was
formerly Fighter Command).
Leigh-Mallory did not see the problem of air superiority in the same
light as Generals Spaatz and Anderson, or for that matter, Sir Charles Portal,
the Chief of Air Staff of the Royal Air Force. Leigh-Mallory had spent
much time in the interwar period specializing in what the British called
“Army Cooperation”-reconnaissance and close air support. In 1937 he
assumed the command of 12 Group in the recently formed Fighter Command.
In October 1940 he moved to 11 Group, the frontline force in the
main fight against the Luftwaffe. From there he became head of Fighter
Command in November 1942. He was a leading force in the transformation
of Fighter Command from a force exclusively devoted to air defense to one
capable of major offensive operations. He presided over the formation of
the new Army Support squadrons in 1943 as well as the creation of 2d
Tactical Air Force, the organization intended to provide support to the British
Army in OVERLORD, and he directed the continued development and
technical improvement in British air defenses. In short, he was one of the
four or five senior Allied airmen most knowledgeable about local air superiority,
but, aside from the cooperation provided by Fighter Command to the
Eighth Air Force in the form of withdrawal support for its attacks, he had
little experience with the inner circles of the strategic bomber offensive.
He simply did not share the hopes and ambitions of the champions of
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Leigh-Mallory’s perspective also differed because the tasks for
which he was responsible were more varied and complex than those faced
by the strategic bomber commanders. He had to plan the full range of
air operations in support of OVERLORD. His long list of responsibilities
included operations against the Luftwaffe bases in France and the
Low Countries, attacks on the German lines of communication, direct support
of the British and American armies on the battlefield, air cover of
the invasion fleets and the sea lanes over which supplies were to flow to
the invading forces, air defense of the British bases from which the invasion
was to be launched, the execution of airborne operations, and, finally
a large share of the tactical reconnaissance provided to the Allied
armies. To these tasks he applied three basic ideas, each of which brought
him into direct conflict with most of his colleagues among the senior air
commanders.
First, he believed that the completion of the POINTBLANK attacks on
aircraft production was not a prerequisite for the success of the invasion.
The reduction of the frontline strength and the production base of the
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