Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LESSONS BEFORE WORLD WAR I1
to more sophisticated and familiar planes which would remain first-line for
the 1940s. While the Ju-52 remained a work-horse in the Luftwaffe, by
1938-39 newer fighters like the Messerschmitt Bf-109 and Bf-110, the
Junkers Ju-87 dive bomber and Ju-88 multi-purpose aircraft, the Dornier
Do-17, Do-215, and Do-217, as well as the Heinkel He-111 and Junkers
Ju-86 bombers all provided Nazi Germany with an enviable array of aerial
weaponry. Such achievements, which shocked the French when they saw
them, disguised certain structural weaknesses in a program that would
have long-term consequences. But, such weaknesses also tended to reflect
German geopolitical and strategic bias for employing Luftwaffe power.6’
Despite the quasi-public ownership of the aviation industry of Nazi
Germany, the government never installed the production controls that
might have been anticipated from a totalitarian regime. Thus, each aircraft
maker tried to build a full panoply of airplanes, from small trainer to multiengine
bomber. German designers refused to concentrate on a smaller number
of aircraft types. Even within the Air Ministry, competing personalities
and bureaucratic goals produced chaos. The Luftwaffe’s technical office
failed to establish priorities and specifications that might have led to consistent
programs and better use of engineering skills, materials, and available
time. In fact, the low level of engine development resulted from this
confusion and thwarted production of a viable four-engine bomber. Then
too, shortages in skilled labor, factory capacity, and raw materials suggested
that the Luftwaffe had to focus on achieving air superiority in a
short war, or at the very beginning of the fighting. There could be no slow
buildup to a desired level later in the conflict. All of this underscored the
short war strategy and, in turn, worked to Hitler’s advantage as he could
use a superior force-in-being diplomatically in attempting to expand the
Reich.62
If the Nazi regime ever entertained intentions of the Luftwaffe’s
emerging as a long-range strategic force, then a series of events and decisions
in the late 1930s effectively modified that goal. The Luftwaffe, in fact,
became primarily a tactical weapon, with missions closely aligned with
ground force strategy. Early manning of the new air arm with former army
officers, Germany’s European position, and the inherent weakness of production
all contributed to this end. The question of whether the major
cause was technical weakness of the four-engine bomber program, or Hitler’s
own particular employment of air power as a diplomatic, not a warfighting
tool at this stage, remains unclear. The fact is, however, the German
air arm did not plan to attain air superiority through strategic bombing
operations, due in part to lessons from the Spanish Civil War.63
Hitler, like Mussolini, saw the Spanish conflict as an opportunity both
to thwart the spread of Communism as well as to test his military machine.
“With the permission of the Fuehrer,” stated Goering later, “I sent a large
part of my transport fleet and a large number of experimental fighter units,
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