Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
1968. U.S. planes were then restricted to raids on North Vietnamese supply
routes south of the 20th parallel-that is, below Thanh Hoa. In an attempt
to curtail those raids, the NVAF began dispatching individual MiGs south,
beyond the area around Hanoi in which they normally operated. On May
23, one MiG raider was shot down by a long-range SAM fired by a U.S.
Navy cruiser steaming in the Gulf of T0nki1-1.~~ MiGs lacked electronic
countermeasure devices (such as jammers) that could defeat or decoy the
Navy fire control and SAM intercept radars.’’ In effect, NVAF MiGs could
not brave the kind of defense system which the North Vietnamese themselves
constructed around Hanoi and Haiphong. As a result, the North
Vietnamese strategy became one of extending the integrated air defense
system established around Hanoi south, first to Thanh Hoa and then, later,
to Vinh. Instead of sending MiGs south, the North Vietnamese opted to
move their entire system (guns, missiles, radars, and MiGs) toward the border
with South Vietnam. U.S. policy, however, permitted armed reconnaissance
of the area below the 20th parallel; in order to carry out this policy,
Seventh Air Force and Task Force 77 units were compelled to attack and
destroy SAM sites in Route Packages I, 11, and 111. The Rules of Engagement
which governed such raids prohibited U.S. planes from attacking
SAM sites that had not yet launched a missile. However, the rules did not
prohibit attacks on North Vietnamese radars, and Seventh Air Force Iron
Hand F-105s conducted a series of hunter-killer operations against radar
sites in Route Package I after April 1968 in order to keep North Vietnam
from achieving its goal of constructing an integrated air defense system
close to the border with South Vietnam.7h
There were limits, however, on what such attacks could accomplish.
First, the number of U.S. aircraft in Southeast Asia declined after the
administration of President Richard Nixon announced a policy of “Vietnamization”
in 1969. Efforts to offset the decline with more sophisticated
weaponry, such as F-1 11 bombers, television-guided unpowered glide
bombs (Walleye), and a system of radio-directed navigation for nightattacking
FAD Phantoms, were not entirely successf~l.~~ U.S. planes did
receive improved flak suppression and radar-homing missiles, but
these improvements were countered to some degree by a delay in deploying
an improved F-4 model (the “E,” with an integral 20-mm gun, more
powerful engines, and improved fire control system) to the the ate^.'^
From 1968 through 1971, the most reliable means of countering North
Vietnamese SAM site development was with F-105 Iron Hand daylight
attacks supplemented and escorted by Phantoms. Yet, the frequency of
such attacks was limited by Rules of Engagement and the number of
available aircraft. A second problem was one that had concerned Air
Force and Navy theater commanders since 1965. With their sanctuaries,
NVAF MiGs were difficult to destroy. With the support of SAMs and anti-
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