Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

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The SA-2, however, was not effective at low altitudes, before its flight path
had stabilized, so it was possible to reduce its effectiveness by approaching
and leaving target areas at low altitudes (under 5,000 feet). After August
1965, F-105 strike aircraft would penetrate an area protected by SAMs at
4,500 feet and then pop up to 10,000 feet in order to roll in on the target.42
Unfortunately, this tactic drastically increased the effectiveness of North
Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery. The introduction of the SA-2 also made
flying escort or barrier missions to counter MiGs far more risky. Phantoms
dared not prowl for MiGs at altitudes where U.S. pilots could see the farthest.
Fortunately, the F-4 was a good climber (approximately 45,000 feet
per minute for all models at combat weight with maximum power using
afterburners for brief
It could head off MiGs with its strong
acceleration. The timing, however, had to be precise; otherwise, the
F-4 would find itself tailed by several SAMs.
The SA-2 and its associated fire control radars were a major challenge
to U.S. air superiority over North Vietnam. It was not that the missiles
were unavoidable; U.S. pilots soon learned that the SA-2 could be outmaneuvered
by a hard diving turn toward the missile’s flight path followed
by “an abrupt four-G rolling pull-up” at high The problem was that
it was cheaper to operate the missile/radar system than it was the U.S.
aircraft/jammer/aerial tanker/complex communications system opposed to
it. SAMs were also a major threat to photoreconnaissance aircraft, which
the North Vietnamese knew would always follow an attack by U.S. strike
forces. When a strike was in pqogress, North Vietnamese SAM directors
had to combat EB-66 jamming and allocate a limited number of SA-2s
among a group of rapidly maneuvering targets. When photoreconnaissance
planes made their passes, however, the targeting problem was simplified,
and SAM barrages threatened to cut off the reconnaissance data which the
Rules of Engagement required.
Three tactics were developed to reduce the SAM threat. The first was
to employ several F-105s in each strike force to attack SAM sites before
the bulk of the attacking planes showed over the target. This tactic failed
because the North Vietnamese learned to turn off their S-band (2,000-4,000
MHz) SAM fire control radars until the strike aircraft neared, leaving insufficient
time for the SAM-suppression aircraft to make their attack. The
North Vietnamese also emplaced SAM batteries and their fire control
radars in the sanctuaries around Hanoi and Haiphong, where they were
immune to attack. Other SAM sites, outside the immune zones, were surrounded
by a steadily increasing armory of light and medium-caliber antiaircraft
guns, which served as a shield against U.S. SAM-suppression
attacks. Finally, the SA-2 and its fire control radar were mobile, so
attempts to roll back SAM batteries often expended ordnance on empty
sites.45
The second anti-SAM technique was jamming. EB-66s acted in coor-
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