Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

BATTLE OF BRITAIN
cross-Channel attack and a maritime war, and it had internal arguments that
were not resolved when the battle started. Disagreement as to the correct
strategy transpired, not only between Reichsmarshall Herman Goering, the
Luftwaffe’s leader, and his field commanders, but even between General
Feldmarschalls Albert Kesselring of Luffjofte 3 and Hugo Sperrle of Luffflotte
2 and the higher commanders and fighter leaders, such as then Maj.
Adolf Galland. Ironically, if the Germans had concentrated on coastal convoys
and the ports, they might have brought Britain to her knees since
Britain’s endurance without imports was only about six weeks. The Germans
could have had the advantage in fighter tactics in that their pairs and
fingers of four were recently proven battle formations and much more flexible
than the RAF’s air-show style “vic” of three, which was cumbersome
as well as a disadvantage for inexperienced pilots. The Luftwaffe did not
have heavy bombers and so entered the battle with mediums intended for
blitzkrieg support operations and with dive bombers, which were vulnerable
in a hostile environment. This meant that the bombers had to be
escorted, and their speed limited the Me-109’s time over England to about
twenty minutes in the combat area since the German pilots refused to use
the leaky, wooden, long-range fuel tanks then available.’
It was a hard-fought struggle in which the number of sorties flown, as
the charts showed, zoomed astronomically to about 5,000 weekly (versus
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring (/eft) and Reich Marshal Hermann Goering
(far right).
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