Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
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on July 20, North Korean soldiers captured Taejon; by July 31, enemy
forces were past Kunsan. U.N. forces were soon bottled up in the Pusan
perimeter, and most Fifth Air Force combat units were flying close support
and interdiction missions. On August 25, when planning for the Inchon
invasion was well underway and the Pusan perimeter was safely held, Fifth
Air Force fighters were ordered to give “first priority” to attacks on North
Korean aircraft. The three bomb groups of FEAF’s Bomber Command
(Provisional) formed on July 8, soon joined the effort against the North
Korean Air Force, and, by the time the U.S. Army’s First Cavalry Division
crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, North Korean air units had
largely ceased to operate. Major North Korean airfields were located at
Pyongyang and near Hungnam. By the first week of October, with most of
South Korea in the hands of U.N. troops, these bases were easily within
range of a variety of Fifth Air Force and Navy aircraft, and all were
bombed effectively. The bombing, along with air-‘to-air operations, virtually
eliminated the North Korean Air Force.
The struggle for air superiority over North and South Korea in 1950
was conducted with jet and propeller-driven aircraft against a small but
aggressive air force with obsolete equipment. The concept of air superiority,
which the Air Force carried from World War 11, served it well for this
first phase of Korean operations: jet fighters (F-80s) first escorted U.N.
ground attack planes and maintained barrier patrols against North Korean
fighters. Once the area proximate to the battle area was secure, Fifth Air
Force fighters, Bomber Command B-29s, and Navy fighters struck directly
at North Korean air bases. World War I1 experience showed it was more
efficient to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground than to wait for them in
the air. Korea confirmed this element of USAF doctrine. The F-80s of the
Fifth Air Force were superior to North Korea’s Yak fighters, and FEAF’s
B-29s could place heavy ordnance loads on North Korean airfields with
near impunity. The North Korean Air Force was inferior across the board.
The result of the struggle was a foregone conclusion-so long as the Soviet
Union and China stayed out of the conflict.
It was not certain the Russians would. Air Force historian Robert E
Futrell, for example, cited several border violations committed by U.N.
aircraft during the push north by U.N. forces during the fall of 1950. An
attack by two F-80s on a Soviet airfield north of the Siberian border on
October 8 produced a strong Soviet protest and prompted Lt. Gen. Partridge,
Fifth Air Force Commander, to set a full-scale alert in case the Russian
response was more than diplomatic. Contrary to FEAF perceptions at
the time, the attack may well have had a deterrent effect by demonstrating
that Russian airfields were vulnerable to Fifth Air Force attack.” The Navy
had a similar brush with Russian air units. On September 4, one of several
piston-engine bombers approaching a carrier task force, which was operating
in the Bay of Korea at the head of the Yellow Sea, was shot down by
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