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Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

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AIR SUPERIORITY<br />

46. “The Luftwaffe <strong>in</strong> Poland,” a study produced by <strong>the</strong> Luftwaffe historical branch (8th<br />

Section), 11.7.44., AHB, Translation No. Y 11/33.<br />

47. The Poles would <strong>of</strong> course show <strong>the</strong>mselves to be outstand<strong>in</strong>g pilots <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> air<br />

defense <strong>of</strong> Great Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> late summer 1940. For <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Poles <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Battle<br />

<strong>of</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, see Francis K. Mason, Battle over Brita<strong>in</strong> (New York, 1969), pp 207-08.<br />

48. Robert Jackson, Fighter! The Story <strong>of</strong><strong>Air</strong> Combat, 1936-1945 (New York, 1979), pp<br />

27-28.<br />

49. <strong>Air</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry, The Rise and Fall <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, 1933-1945 (New York,<br />

1983). p 54.<br />

50. Maier, et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkreig, vol 11, p 124.<br />

51. BAIMA, RL 311025, Front-Flugzeug-Verluste im September 1939.<br />

52. For <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se operational concepts before <strong>the</strong> war, see <strong>Air</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry,<br />

The Rise and Fall <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, 1933-1945, p 48.<br />

53. For a fuller exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategic situation on <strong>the</strong> outbreak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war, see<br />

Chapter X <strong>of</strong> Murray, The Change <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Balance <strong>of</strong> Power, 1938-1939.<br />

54. Ibid., Chapters IX and X.<br />

55. Telford Taylor, The March <strong>of</strong> Conquest, The German Victories <strong>in</strong> Western Europe,<br />

1940 (New York, 1958), pp 1171-18.<br />

56. <strong>Air</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry, The Rise and Fall <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, pp 60-61.<br />

57. For a graphic description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enormous difficulties under which Allied naval and<br />

land forces operated as well as <strong>the</strong> general strategic handicap result<strong>in</strong>g from German air<br />

superiority, see Mart<strong>in</strong> Gilbert, W<strong>in</strong>ston Churchill, vol VI.<br />

58. For those who th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>the</strong> contemporary world has little need for history, one<br />

might note that <strong>the</strong> contemporary situation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gulf states <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Middle East, with relatively<br />

<strong>in</strong>effective air forces compared to <strong>the</strong> super powers, <strong>in</strong>vites a similar use <strong>of</strong> air power:<br />

air strikes to s<strong>of</strong>ten up <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous opposition, airborne units to seize and hold <strong>the</strong> strategic<br />

airfields, and a rapid build up by airlift <strong>of</strong> both ground forces and ground support forces<br />

for air units (admittedly on a grander scale). Once such a force had achieved general air<br />

superiority <strong>the</strong>re would be little hope <strong>of</strong> an effective counterstrike.<br />

59. Taylor, March <strong>of</strong> Conquest, p 184.<br />

60. <strong>Air</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry, The Rise and Fall <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>, p 66.<br />

61. See Table 11, for <strong>the</strong> cost to <strong>the</strong> German bombers force <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Battle <strong>of</strong> France.<br />

62. See <strong>in</strong> particular, Patrice Buffotot and Jacques Ogier, “L‘armte de I’air franGaise<br />

dans la campagne de France (10 mai-25 ju<strong>in</strong> 1940);’ Revue historique des Armkes, Vol 11,<br />

NO 3, pp 88-117.<br />

63. Major L. F. Ellis, The War <strong>in</strong> France and Flanders, 1939-1940 (London, 1953), p 37.<br />

64. Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle, France 1940 (London, 1953), p 37.<br />

65. See <strong>the</strong> discussion <strong>in</strong> Galland, The First and <strong>the</strong> Last, pp 2-5, which suggests that<br />

<strong>the</strong> missions that he was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first two weeks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> campaign were ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />

screen<strong>in</strong>g missions to keep Allied aircraft away from German army units or direct free chase<br />

missions <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Bf-109s aggressively sought out Allied aircraft.<br />

66. See my contribution on <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> Luftwaffe close air support <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early<br />

war years <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> History’s companion volume to this study.<br />

67. Ellis, The War <strong>in</strong> France and Flanders, p 54.<br />

68. “Der E<strong>in</strong>satz der deutschen Luftwaffe wahrend der ersten 11 Tage des Frankreichfeldzuges,”<br />

Auszilge aus dem taglichen Lagemeldungen des Oberbefehlshabers der Luftwaffe,<br />

Abl. Ic., AFHRC: K 113.306-3, v 2. The German losses are attributable to a wide<br />

variety <strong>of</strong> causes: Allied antiaircraft artillery as well as fighters contributed to <strong>the</strong>se losses.<br />

69. See Ellis, The War <strong>in</strong> France and Flanders, p 53, for a general discussion <strong>of</strong> British<br />

losses.<br />

70. Horne, To Lose a Battle, p 253.<br />

71. Ellis, The War <strong>in</strong> France and Flanders, pp 55-56.<br />

72. Ibid., p 56.<br />

73. Ibid., p 56.<br />

74. “Das Jagdgeschwader 27 des VII Flieger-Korps im Frankreichfeldzug, 1940,” Gener-<br />

almajor A. D. Max Ibel, 25.6.53., BAIMA, RL 10/591.<br />

75. Jackson, Fighter, p 42.<br />

76. Testimony <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former chief <strong>of</strong> German air <strong>in</strong>telligence Schmid on 18.6.54.,<br />

108

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