Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHEAST ASIA
MiG-21s tried a new tactic. Approaching USAF formations from behind at
very low altitude, the MiGs zoomed to high altitude, arced over and plummeted
down through the U.S. planes, firing two infrared-seeking missiles
(similar to Sidewinder) each. Then the MiGs split up and headed for a sanctuary-either
China or one of the North Vietnamese fields still immune to
attack (Phuc Yen or Cia Lam). This tactic was temporarily successful. In
September, more than double the expected number of USAF strike aircraft
were forced to dump their bombs short of the target in order to avoid
MiG-21 attacks.’O SAM sites also fired barrages of missiles on initial optical
guidance, and SAM fire control radars were kept off the air as long as possible
in order to avoid attacks by Wild Weasel and Iron Hand. In response,
President Johnson authorized attacks on Phuc Yen and Bac Mai airfields
near Hanoi. By December, most NVAF MiGs had fled to China, but the
NVAF remained active, with MiG-21s and MiG-17s staging coordinated
attacks on U.S. forces.71
The first 3 months of 1968 showed how the air superiority war over
North Vietnam had become a matter of combat between missile and gunarmed
high performance jet fighters. From 1965 through March 1968, the
ratio of SAMs fired to U.S. aircraft downed by them rose from 13 to 1 to
200 to 1. Over the same period, U.S. losses to NVAF fighters grew from 1
percent of all U.S. aircraft lost per year to 22 percent. On the other side,
NVAF MiG losses rose from 2 in 1965 to 17 in 1966 and then 59 in 1967.’’
Electronic warfare pods for F-105s and F-~s, plus experience dealing with
SAMs and the efforts of Wild Weasel and Iron Hand, steadily and drastically
reduced the SAM threat. However, as the NVAF pilots received more
training and better aircraft equipped with missiles, and as more of them
survived encounters with U.S. planes, the NVAF MiG force-mostly based
in China-grew more aggressive and effective. The North Vietnamese
pilots did not wrest air superiority away from U.S. forces, but they challenged
U.S. dominance even more severely than had the Chinese in Korea
in the early 1950~.~~ They were able to do so because, first, they worked as
part of an integrated system of air control and, second, U.S. rules of
engagement gave them sanctuaries and the knowledge that USAF and USN
strike forces would have to come to North Vietnam and struggle for air
superiority on a day-to-day basis.
After President Johnson halted the interdiction campaign north of the
20th parallel at the end of March 1968, there were only two important
developments in the air superiority war until North Vietnamese troops
invaded South Vietnam in April 1972. First, North Vietnam attempted to
extend its integrated and centrally directed air defense system south to the
border with South Vietnam. And, second, the USAF and USN in Southeast
Asia developed an integrated system of air battle management based on
sophisticated systems of warning, communication, and coordination. The
first development had its roots in an incident that occurred on May 23,
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