Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
sorties a day. By January 1943, enemy sorties averaged only fifteen to
twenty per day, and this figure was further reduced in February and March
to ten or twelve, and in April to only about six sorties per day. This decline
resulted from the increasing weight of Allied air attacks wresting air superiority
from the Many operational Axis aircraft moved from offensive
operations to defensive roles in protection of convoys, airfields, and
communications.
The aircraft of the Allied Mediterranean Air Command outnumbered
the Axis aircraft operating in the theater by a ratio of about 2 to 1. On April
16, the Allies had 3,241 combat aircraft, while the Germans and Italians
each had an estimated 900. (See Table 5-1) The relative strength of Allied
air forces in the Mediterranean, as compared with the Axis air forces, was
even greater than these figures indicate, for at any given time about 80
percent of the Mediterranean Air Command’s aircraft were serviceable
compared to about 58 percent for the Germans and 50 percent for the
Italians. In fact, the Allies probably had 1,600 more serviceable aircraft
available at any one time than their Axis enemies.’O
Air strength comparability remains difficult to judge even by 1943. In
many respects, comparing differences in aircraft performance proves no
more helpful than statistical comparisons. Certainly, the Axis had no longrange,
heavy bombardment aircraft like the B-17 or B-24. Comparing
medium bombers such as the American B-25s and B-26s with German
Ju-88~ is difficult and of doubtful value. In general, although Allied bombers
were superior to Axis bombers, only the latest model Spitfire could
equal German FW-190 or Me-109 fighter aircraft in speed, climb rate, and
maneuverability. The German twin-engine Me-1 10 fighter was no match
for the American P-38, while the only dive bomber used was the German
Ju-87 Stuka. Only the British used antiques like the Fleet Air Arm Albacores,
yet such aircraft were part of a powerful air team, for they marked
targets for medium and heavy night bomber^.^' Added to the question of
materiel, other factors affecting air strength included skill and training of
aircrews and commanders; command and control; doctrine, strategy and
tactics; as well as logistics and technology.
By the middle of April 1943, the Allied air forces were superior to the
Axis air forces in the Mediterranean. The Allies had more, if not better,
aircraft than the Axis. Allied aircrews were becoming more proficient with
each passing day, while the Axis lagged badly in the use of new technology
such as radar. Allied logistical support had been strengthened, while the
Axis forces in Tunisia lived on a hand-to-mouth basis because of the airnaval
blockade. In matters of tactics, doctrine, and command and control,
the Allied air forces were becoming increasingly skillful. Strategically, the
most powerful of the Axis air forces, the German Luftwaffe, was fighting a
three-front war against the Anglo-Americans in the Mediterranean and
Northwest Europe, and with Russia in the east. What would decide the air
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