Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
At the time, it was difficult to know what to make of the inflated claims
submitted by the Eighth's air gunners, except to admit that they were too
high. Inflated they certainly were, but in October the Luftwaffe lost no
less than 41.9 percent of the fighter establishment with which it had entered
the month.90
In short, both the attackers and the defenders suffered casualties at a
very high rate in 1943. The difference between the two was to be found in
the fact that the production and replacement pipeline continued to expand
the Allied air forces and to maintain the level of aircrew quality, while the
Luftwaffe was barely able to maintain its frontline strength with aircrew of
diminishing quality.
The first six months of 1944 continued the basic pattern laid down in
1943. In January, the Eighth Air Force wrote off 211 bombers. The figure
continued to rise to 409 in April, then fell off slightly to 366 in May and
more significantly to 280 in June.91 The Eighth also lost increasing numbers
of fighters over this period, the toll rising from a January low of 65 to a June
high of 242. Expressed as a percentage of credited sorties, however, the
heavy bomber losses fell when compared to the horrors of August and
October 1943. The highest percentage was 3.8 in January; by May it had
fallen still further to 1.1. (See Figure 6-6) These changes were the consequence
of a greatly expanded force and the provision of deep fighter
escort. In July of 1943, the average number of heavy bomber aircraft
available for operations was 378. By January 1944, the figure had climbed
FIGURE 6-6
Eighth Air Force Heavy Bomber Losses
Expressed as a Percentage of Sorties
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
1943 1943 1943 1943 1943 1943 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944
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