Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

WAR AGAINST JAPAN
certain degree of uneasiness permeated the civilian populace. A number of
military leaders did comprehend the nature of the air threat to Japan. A
War Ministry general officer, for example, was astonished by the level of
casualties as a factor of the minor bomb load dropped-double the ratio
reported to have been caused by German air raids on England. A new civil
defense plan was submitted to Tojo, with supporting documentation on
England’s experience and on the terrible vulnerability to strategic bombardment
of the overconcentrated production base in the Kawasaki-Omori
area. Tojo again stymied the proposal, though he did not reject it outright
this time. Saying that Japan could not be bombed on the same scale as
Germany and that needless worries were being expressed, Tojo would
authorize only facilities that did not require heavy expenditures of funds
and materials. Front-line combat zones, he insisted, must continue to take
precedence over the demands of the home front. Although a portion of the
Army General Staff was sympathetic to the War Ministry’s proposition,
large-scale funds were never forthcoming, and effective civil defense measures
did not materialize, even after the initial shock caused by the Doolittle
The two services, however, did take stock of their poor performance
on April 18. The Navy, which was responsible for seaward search and
attack operations, had failed in both capacities, revealing insufficient patrol
and intelligence collection capabilities. Charged with the main mission of
air defense of the homeland, the Army had shown numerous tactical weaknesses:
lack of a comprehensive warning net; delay in the transmission of
information; low reliability of intelligence, caused by confusion; shortage
and low capability of interceptor aircraft; insufficient training of antiaircraft
gun crews, who were unacquainted with the characteristics of any
aircraft and who fired blindly against low-flying planes.32
Japan’s fighter and antiaircraft (AA) defenses obviously needed to be
reinforced and upgraded. The Army set a target of tripling the number of
fighters to 400 and almost quadrupling the number of guns to 1,900. By the
end of April 1942, 2 AA batteries were recalled to the homeland from the
Southwest Pacific and assigned to the Eastern District Army. From production,
108 more guns were allocated to that army, and another 160 guns to all
the other military districts in the homeland. As for fighters, a squadron was
brought back from Burma in April and assigned to the defense of Tokyo. In
an effort to establish more effective tactical air units within the structure of
GDC and the 1st Air Army, the 17th Air Wing was also organized under the
air army and placed under the operational control of the Eastern Army
command. The wing consisted of 2 fighter groups, an independent fighter
squadron, and a command reconnaissance squadron. In May and June of
the same year the 18th and 19th Air Wings were similarly activated and
assigned to the Central and Western Army commands, respectively. These
3 wings constituted the homeland’s main defense units until early 1944.
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