Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

WAR AGAINST JAPAN
American planes went down, several of them because of the overeagerness
of green Hellcat pilots who broke formation and sought dogfights.
The weather was wretched again on February 17, but the U.S. Navy
bombings and strafings continued throughout the morning. Near noon,
Mitscher was obliged to end his flight operations. The Navy later judged
that the strikes had been “substantial but not spectacular,” although Admiral
Sherman said he could see “the Rising Sun setting.” The best results
were achieved not against ground facilities but in air-to-air combat and in
runs against parked planes, although the claims for both days were somewhat
scaled down: 322-341 aircraft reportedly shot down and 177-190
wrecked on the ground. A total of 60 USN planes were lost in the course of
738 combat engagements, and a further 28 aircraft were lost to other
causes. Contesting the skies with the Japanese air forces seemed to have
brought about 3 days of immunity from aerial attacks for the U.S. forces on
Iwo Jima.43
Japanese sources assert that the Naval General Staff in Tokyo did
expect raids against the homeland as early as February 1.5, and that both
the IJNAF and IJAAF went on alert promptly. But, most importantly, on
February 9 the Air Defense Command had already decided to avoid engaging
enemy light and medium aircraft and to try to conserve air strength for
the decisive campaign in the homeland. As for the USN strikes on February
16, there was no tactical warning because the first American fighters
came in at an altitude of only 1,300 feet. One IJAAF night-fighter group and
all “second-class” flight personnel were ordered to take refuge at alternate
airfields. Aircraft in the region that would not be committed to combat were
to have their fuel drained and ammunition unloaded and be hidden far from
the airstrips. Ten minutes after the initial sightings of the Americans on the
early morning of February 16, the first of 4 U.S. Navy waves (estimated at
90, 90, 100, 120 planes, respectively) started attacking IJNAF and IJAAF
bases in the coastal zones of Chiba and Ibaragi prefectures. In the afternoon,
3 new waves of U.S. Navy aircraft-estimated at 90 in the first, and
450 in the second and third-hit an aircraft factory and airfields deeper
inland. IJAAF interceptors reported shooting down 62 U.S. planes and
damaging 27, at a cost of only 37 fighters and some scout planes. Antiaircraft
artillery (mainly 70-mm and 80-mm guns) and automatic cannon
batteries emplaced near the airfields claimed to have shot down 19 and
damaged 17 enemy planes.44 The Japanese figures mentioned above for
USN aircraft downed on February 16 are much higher than the actual
losses; but U.S. claims similarly exceed Japanese losses by an even larger
factor.
The Japanese Air Defense Command concluded that continuation of
such combat as had been waged on February 16 would deplete IJNAF-
IJAAF capabilities in short order. On the night of the 16th, the two best
IJAAF air groups in the defending 10th Air Division were pulled out and
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