Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHEAST ASIA
system.80 This problem was not overcome until March 1968, when Air
Force data displays received signals from the Navy’s NTDS through the
Marine Corps Tactical Data SystemR1 With this improvement, Air Force
and Navy air controllers could see on their radarscopes what their respective
surveillance and tracking radars were picking up. The Air Force itself
also progressively modified its data display and communications systems.
In late 1965, for example, data from aerial surveillance EC-121s was
relayed by voice radio to USAF strike formations through tactical air control
centers. By 1967, this data was apparently relayed and displayed
automatically.82
As data-handling techniqwes improved, so too did the security of Air
Force communications. When Seventh Air Force was created in April 1966,
there was no secure voice link between its command center at Tan Son
Nhut Air Base and subordinate control centers at Da Nang and Udorn, or
between those centers and their airborne components.83 Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) links between strike forces over North Vietnam and
radio relay planes orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin were also “in the clear.”
Such unencrypted communications were a source of intelligence for the
North Vietnamese. When U.S. jamming aircraft clouded North Vietnamese
radars, enemy defenders used radio intercept and directionfinding
techniques to gain advance warning of the direction and strength
of U.S. attacks. In 1969, a special program (Seek Silence) finally gave
Seventh Air Force a high degree of real-time signals security, thereby
denying the North Vietnamese an important source of info~mation.~~ By
1970, USAF armed reconnaissance sorties operating over Route Package
I in North Vietnam were receiving up-to-the-minute reports on NVAF
MiG movements over secure communications links. In 1965, USAF aircraft
operating near Hanoi were beyond direct communication with tactical
control centers in Thailand and South Vietnam. By 1970, the
Seventh Air Force Directorate of Combat Operations had the capability
to monitor both enemy and friendly air activity over Route Package I
and to direct appropriate U.S. forces against enemy threats. In effect, the
U.S. had constructed its own ground-control-intercept and early warning
systems over enemy territory by combining aerial early warning aircraft,
secure communications, and data display and analysis assets. The key
to holding air superiority over North Vietnam in the face of an integrated,
well coordinated defense was effective, real-time battle management,
which gave strike and reconnaissance forces a comprehensive view of
what was happening and then aided unit commanders in spreading their
electronic warfare, SAM suppression, and MiG cover assets among enemy
threats. (See Figure 10-2)
As ROLLING THUNDER progressed, the U.S. and North Vietnamese
forces battling for control of the air improved their weapons and tactics.
543