Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
attacks against a strongly defended target, and for the remainder of the year
attacks on Rabaul were at night.z1
While AAF B-17s and to a lesser extent RAAF PBYs were striking as
best they could at Rabaul airfields and shipping, other aircraft were not
idle. Fortunately for General Kenney, the Guadalcanal battle absorbed
most of the Japanese air effort, but the Japanese land advance from Buna
over the mountains toward Port Moresby brought them eventually within
twenty-six miles of their goal. If he was to retain his base in New Guinea,
Kenney had to render all possible aid to the ground forces opposing the
Japanese advance, which he did. Attempts to interdict supplies and reinforcements
coming into Buna by sea were not particularly successful. Lack
of experience was partly responsible, but so was the fact that the Japanese
usually provided air cover for their convoys, and the A-20s and B-26s that
made the attacks were understandably inaccurate when under fighter attack.
Once again, the need for fighter escort was demonstrated.z*
Because the war in Europe took precedence over the Pacific War, and
the desperate fighting in and over Guadalcanal had temporary priority over
New Guinea, the Fifth Air Force, created on September 3, 1942, as a headquarters
for the American components of the Allied Air Forces in SWPA,
had limited resources for the air superiority battle over Papua. P-~OS,
P-39s, and P4OOs could cross the Owen Stanley Mountains and strike
Japanese targets, but they could not fight long air battles with enemy
fighters. Their tactics had to be offensive, not defensive. Twenty-five
P-38s had arrived in Australia in mid-August, and these twin-engine
fighters would give the Fifth Air Force the range needed. Unfortunately,
the fuel tanks proved to be defective and had to be rebuilt. It was
December before the P-38s could engage in full-scale combat in SWPA.
B-26s and B-25s had enough range to attack airfields on the north coast
of New Guinea, and by adding bomb-bay tanks to A-20s, “Pappy” Gunn,
an inventive genius who served American air power well in the Southwest
Pacific, gave these light bombers the range they needed to cross the
mountains and strike the north coast. Gunn also added four .50-caliber
machineguns to the firepower of the A-20s and made them formidable
strafing aircraft.23
By August 1942, improved airstrips at Port Moresby permitted Allied
aircraft to intensify strikes against Japanese airfields on the north coast of
New Guinea. In general, B-26s and B-25s bombed from medium altitude,
P-40~ glide-bombed, approaching their targets at an angle of about thirty
degrees, and other fighters and A-20s strafed. It must be emphasized that
Australians played as great or perhaps a greater role in this campaign than
Anierican pilots and crews. These attacks kept the runways at Lae, Salamaua,
and Buna out of commission part of the time, and they destroyed
some Japanese aircraft on the ground and some in the air, but they did not
prevent reinforcement from Rabaul. On August 17 a Japanese attack on
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