Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
vailed among the leaders of the MiG formations.” Forty-one MiG “formations
numbering up to six (6) aircraft have made attacks without losing the
integrity of the formation and have demonstrated high skill in their ability
to maneuver with this force.”42 MiG-15 pilots flew tight approach formations,
“approximately half” of those engaged maneuvered well defensively,
and MiG elements were very
In addition, MiG pilots tried tactics
suited to their aircraft:
1) Scissors or Butterfly. One of two aircraft “above and slightly behind
a single target” would dive on the target, “go below it and pull up.”44
The second high MiG would start diving when the first was making
his pass. As a result, their “target cannot pull up, dive, or turn without
being subjected to fire.”45
2) YO-YO. MiGs would orbit high above the F-86s and swoop down in
pairs for a fast firing pass. “This tactic is frequently used by the
MiGs with the aircraft in train so that the target, or targets, are
under continuous attacks.”46
3) Decoying. Sixteen MiGs chased by eight Sabres would divide into
two groups of eight. The Sabres would split into two groups of four.
The MiGs would split again, so that it was two F-86s on four MiGs.
The MiGs would divide one last time, and the Sabres would have to
choose which element to pursue. The MiG element not pursued
would try to get behind the F-86 element.47
MiG pilots employed other tactics, as well as variations of these three, in
an effort to isolate individual Sabres or to subject small groups of F-86s to
a steady stream of cannon fire. When they lost the initiative, the MiGs
broke or dove away in formation and headed across the Yalu.
F-86 pilots noticed two variations in this pattern of formation and twoplane
element flying. The more dangerous case was eventually referred to
as the “Honcho” pilot-a lone MiG with “skill and tenacity in his attack,”
able to “engage the friendly fighters who turn into his attack with ferocity
and daring.”4s There is evidence these pilots were Russian; 4th Fighter-
Interceptor Wing pilots certainly took that view in 1952.49 At the same time,
there were numbers of Chinese pilots in 1951 who possessed more bravery
than skill. Several attacked whole flights of F-86s without-as the 4th
Fighter-Interceptor Group ironically put it-“planning the future.”SO These
attackers were usually shot up badly. All the MiGs employed one basic
evasive tactic: running to the Yalu. This often worked in 1951 because the
F-86A could not overtake a MiG-15 in a flat-out, level race. Later, when
the USAF equipped its Sabre squadrons with the F-86F, it became a far
tighter contest.
Withdrawal tactics were very different for the two sides. MiGs had
only to reach the Yalu. The F-86s, and the bombers, reconnaissance
planes, and fighter bombers that the Sabres protected, had to get below
Seoul. In the early months of 1951, after FEAF’s B-29s had resumed bomb-
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