Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
TABLE 10-10
Air-to-Air Weapon Success Rate, May 1972-Jan 1973
Weapon Ratio of Kills Ratio Expressed
to Firing Attempts as a Percentage
AIMK-4 (Falcon)
AIM-9 (Sidewinder)
AIM-7 (Sparrow)
20-mm gun
Total
015 0.0%
101100 10.0
231216 10.6
7/14 50.0
401335 11.9%
Source:Airpower in Three Wars, p. 151.
and very high-speed characteristics. Nonetheless, it was not the equal of
the MiG-17 in a dogfight.
U.S. fighter performance against NVAF MiGs was the source of some
controversy between the USAF and USN, spokesmen for the latter claiming
that Navy training in air-to-air tactics prior to LINEBACKER was superior
to that developed by the Air Force. This was not a minor issue. After
ROLLING THUNDER, for example, the Air Force discovered that proper
training had made a major difference in the airto-air combat performance
of its fighter pi10ts.I~~ In September 1968, the USN established the Fighter
Weapons School, where F-4 pilots were matched against highly maneuverable
F-5 aircraft flying like MiGs. The heart of the Navy’s training program
was an Air Combat Maneuvering Range, where engaged aircraft were monitored
from the ground and their maneuvers recorded. After an exercise
was completed, those involved went over it again by reviewing the recordings.
The special range, with specially equipped aircraft, allowed USN
fighter pilots to learn how best to deal with MiGs, especially the MiG-17.lI5
The Air Force did not have such a range, even though the Aerospace
Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command did have air combat tactics
courses which matched F4s against aircraft with different characteristics.
The problem with the Air Force programs was that, in the legitimate
interest of maintaining safety standards, air-to-air maneuvers were too constrained.
However, it was not an easy task to down NVAF fighters, even
when U.S. aircraft carried guns and could rely on accurate air warning.
(See Table 10-10)
Critics of the air-to-air record of U.S. aircraft usually make the mistake
of comparing the ratio of planes lost on both sides in Korea with similar
ratios from the air engagements over North Vietnam. Korea and Vietnam,
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