Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
Subsequent developments made the plan to invade Mindanao seem
conservative. Admiral William Halsey’s Task Force 38, the main strike
force of the U.S. Navy, set sail from Eniwetok for the Palaus and the Philippines.
This fleet included 9 fleet carriers and 8 light carriers with a plane
complement of well over 500 F6Fs, 315 dive bombers (SB2Cs, or Helldivers),
and almost 250 torpedo bombers. Obviously this was a major concentration
of air power in itself. After striking the Palaus, scheduled for early
invasion, Halsey on September 9 and 10 struck at Mindanao. The Japanese
on Mindanao did not even attempt to intercept Halsey’s aircraft. On
September 12, Halsey moved to the north and hit the central Philippines.
Here there was more resistance than at Mindanao, but it was still feeble.
One of Halsey’s pilots, who was shot down over Leyte and then rescued,
understood from the people of Leyte that there were no Japanese on the
island. Halsey recommended to Admiral Nimitz, who passed it on to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the scheduled landings in Mindanao, as well as
others in the Palaus and at Yap Island, be cancelled and that all the troops
and naval forces thus made available be thrown into an early invasion of
Leyte.-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to bypass Mindanao and Yap but to
carry out the invasion of the Palaus. The troops originally intended for Yap
and already at sea were sent on to General MacArthur to participate in the
invasion of Leyte, as recommended by Halsey. The landing was scheduled
for October 20, and much had to be done before it could take place. The
Philippines, except for Mindanao, were out of range of all FEAF aircraft.
Only heavy bombers could reach Mindanao, but after Morotai was developed,
long-range fighters from there could escort such bomber missions.
Except for that, however, all preparatory bombing for the invasion of Leyte
and protection of the landings until satisfactory airfields could be established
on the island would be the task of the Navy.
In the Philippines, Japanese air was still strong, and the reinforcement
route from the home islands by way of the Ryukyu Islands and Formosa
was a short one. More important, a new factor would appear in the air
struggle over Leyte, the Japanese suicide pilot, or kamikaze. In the previous
air operations in the South and Southwest Pacific, when most, or
even a considerable portion of the Japanese planes mounting an attack
were destroyed, the attack was usually rendered ineffective. To accomplish
this normally required air superiority, but not necessarily air supremacy. In
the Philippines, Allied targets, and especially ships, were not safe so long
as there was one Japanese pilot alive with access to one operational aircraft.
Not even air supremacy was enough; every Japanese aircraft within
range had to be rendered inoperable, or a kamikaze attack was possible.
And the kamikazes brought about this change just at the time when SWPA
forces moved out of the zone of air supremacy they had established in New
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