Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

LUFTWAFFE AGAINST POLAND
had no interest in strategic bombing because it possessed no four-engine bombers on the
outbreak of the war. In fact the Germans were hard at work attempting to make a suitable
four-engine strategic bomber. See in particular Edward Home’s excellent article: “The
Luftwaffe’s Failure to Develop a Heavy Bomber Before World War 11,” Aerospace Historian,
Mar 1977.
27. On the lack of interest in a long-range fighter in the U.S. Army Air Forces, see
Thomas A. Fabyanic, “A Critique of United States Air War Planning, 1941-1944,” St. Louis
University Dissertation (1973) and Bernard Boylan, “The Development of the Long-Range
Escort Fighter,” unpublished manuscript (Maxwell AFB, 1955), AFHRC. The RAF attitude
was quite similar: escort fighters of high performance and range simply could not be developed.
See the lecture given by the future vice commander of Bomber Command R. H. N. S.
Saundby to the RAF Staff College in May 1937, “Bombing Tactics,” Public Record Office
(PRO) AIR 5/1132, pp 10-15.
28. Adolf Galland, The First and the Lasr (New York, 1954), p 31.
29. Ibid., p 63.
30. Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany (Chicago, 1970), p 298.
31. Matthew Cooper, The German Air Force, 1933-1945, An Anatomy of Failure (New
York, 1981), p 59.
32. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and
the Rise of Air Power, 1930-1940 (New York, 1961). pp 49-50.
33. Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945 (London, 1948),
p 14.
34. For a more detailed examination of the military and strategic context within which
the great powers were operating in the fall of 1938, see Murray, The Change in the European
Balance of Power, 1938-1939, chap VII.
35. As in 1939 the French had no intention of carrying out any significant offensive
operation against the German frontier. See particularly Gamelin’s discussions with the British
Chiefs of Staff in PRO CAB 211595, 26.9.38, “Notes on a Meeting.”
36. The after-action reports by the First and Third Air Forces are the basic documents
for German air plans against Czechoslovakia. Both underline the general unpreparedness of
the Luftwaffe for a military campaign against Czechoslovakia. See Bundesarchiv/Militarachiv
(BA.MA) RL7/67, Der Kommandierende General und Befehlshaber der Luftwaffengruppe
l., Ia Nr 197/38, 11.7.38., Betr: “Planstudie ‘Griin’ 1938”; BA/MA RL 7/164, Der
kornmandierende General und Befehlshaber de Luftwaffengruppe 3., Ia Nr. 7829/38,
1.12.38.” Erfahrungsbericht iiber die Spannungzeit 1938 ‘Fall Griin,’ Teil 111”; and BA/MA
RL 7/67, “Planstudie 1938, Hauptteil 11, Teil A. Aufmarsch und Kampfanweisung ’Fall
Griin,’ zur Lw. Gruppenkommando 3., Fiihrungsabteilung, Az Plst 38/Ia op, Nr. 525/38,
20.7.38.”
37. “Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables, August 1938-April 1945,” Air Historical
Branch, Translation No. VII/107.
38. Chef des Nachschubsamts, Nr. 3365/g. Kdos. 3.11.28.. Milch Collection, Imperial
War Museum, Reel 55, Vol57.
39. BA/MA RL 71164, Der Kommandierende General und Befehlshaber der Luftwaffengruppe
3., Ia Nr. 7829/38, 1.12.38”; “Ehfahrungsbericht iiber die Spannungszeit 1938 ‘Fall
Griin,’ Teil 111.”
40. BA/MA RL 7/1, Der kommandierende General und Befehlshaber der Luftwaffengruppe
I., Ia Nr. 197/38., 11.7.38 Betr: “Planstudie ‘Griin’ 1938.”
41. BA/MA RL 7/67, “Planstudie 1938, Hauptteil 11, Teil A. “Aufmarsch und Kampfanweisung
‘Fall Griin,’ zur Lw. Gruppenkommando 3., Fiihrungsabteilung, Az Plst 38/Ia op,
Nr. 525/38, 20.7.38.”
42. For a further examination of the military and strategic factors involved in the 1938
confrontation, see Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939, chap
VII.
43. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York, 1964), p 499.
44. Serious problems would still show up in the offensive against Poland, particularly in
the army. See Williamson Murray, “German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in
Professionalism,” Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1981.
45. Maier, et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweire Weltkrieg, vol 11, p 97.
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