Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE
destruction of 20 Ilyushin 11-28 bombers at Luxor by French fighterbombers
operating from Israeli bases)37 brought the total claim up
to 260. Yet, the American military analyst and historian, Trevor Dupuy,
has pointed out that the Egyptian Air Force was estimated to consist
of only 255 aircraft at the start of these raids, and at least 40 planes
escaped.38 Moreover, one might add, 5 MiGs, 6 Vampires, and a Meteor
had fallen victims to the IAF39 before the British and French entered the
conflict.*
Whatever the actual number destroyed on the ground in the course of
the Anglo-French attacks, it was certainly true that the EAF was no longer
able to fight by noon on November 1. Indeed, the Egyptians had apparently
lost all will to fight by nightfall of the previous day, and the IAF was in
undisputed control of the air over Sinai. “Actually, the Egyptian Air Force
did send over [Israel] 11-28 bombers on two occasions, on the nights
of the 30th and 31st, one bomber on each mission, but they dropped their
bombs on open ground, far from city or village, without discrimination and
without causing damage,” according to General Dayan. No Israeli aircraft
had been lost in air-to-air engagements, while “at least four MiGs and four
Vampires were shot down by our pilots.”40
The bulk of the Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed on the ground
by the Anglo-French attacks, and air-to-air engagements between Israeli
and Egyptian machines had been relatively few. The Israelis had achieved
and retained air superiority more by Egyptian default than by their own
efforts. Strategies on both sides had been unsophisticated, the Egyptians
making no coherent attempt to establish air superiority even before the
Anglo-French intervention, and the Israelis relying on standing patrols or
the quick reaction times permitted by the comparatively short distances
involved to get their aircraft to the right place at the right time. In that
regard, the very smallness of their air force also worked to their advantage;
other things being equal, small organizations normally have quicker reaction
times than larger ones.
Tactically, however, Tolkovsky’s ideas had proved extremely successful.
Multi-purpose machines, flown by extremely well-trained
pilots employing superior tactics, clearly could defeat larger numbers
of specialized fighters flown by less skillful pilots using inferior tactics.
*This seems a good point at which to caution the reader against accepting any set of figures
relating to Middle Eastern wars at face value, particularly those relating to strengths or casualties.
The “fog of war” and, indeed, of peacetime tensions, is often inpenetrable; security on the one
hand, and propaganda on the other, are both immensely important; and deceptoin is a way of life.
“Official” figures are rarely available and, when they are, are not to be trusted. Accordingly, unofficial
ones vary widely, even when proferrred by the most reputable authors. Those given in this
essay are more likely to be generally right than specifically so; they represent the author’s “educated
guesses” from among the many alternative sets available.
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