Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

OPERATION OVERLORD
percent of credited sorties in July, rose to 6.0 in August, fell by half in
September when the Eighth largely refrained from attacking German targets,
and then rose sickeningly to 9.2 percent in O~tober.~’ Unescorted
heavy bombers could not gain the necessary degree of air superiority over
the Luftwaffe in being in order to attack effectively the Luftwaffe in
prospect.
In the early period of the struggle for general air superiority, Eaker did
not receive aircraft from the United States at the rate laid down in the
POINTBLANK plan. His logistical and maintenance services were inadequate,
in part because Washington had not furnished sufficient trained personnel
to make up for those diverted to the war in North Africa, and in part
because of organizational difficulties in the theater. To make matters worse,
an adequate flow of trained aircrew to expand the force and to provide
replacements did not materiali~e.~~
Under the POINTBLANK plan, the heavy bomber strength of the Eighth
Air Force was to increase to 944 by June 30, 1943, 1,192 by September 30,
and 1,746 by December 3 1 .43 The actual numbers made available fell short:
800, 1,000, and 1,630 respectively (daily averages for the months of July
and October 1943 and January 1944). The difficulties of the logistics system
in the theater are illustrated by the figures for bomber aircraft on hand in
the tactical units in the same months: 589, 763, and 1,082. The shortcomings
of the aircraft maintenance system are made clear by the relatively low
numbers of aircraft serviceable for action: 378, 535, and 842. The aircrew
situation made things even worse. In July, Eighth Air Force possessed no
more than 315 crews for 378 aircraft; in October, the situation was no better-479
crews for 535 aircraft.44
Eaker’s problems were not viewed sympathetically in Washington. For
over two years, Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the Commanding General of the
Army Air Forces, and friends of the AAF in the Roosevelt administration,
the press, and the Congress had defended the idea of a strategic bombing
offensive against Germany from the competing demands generated by all
the other theaters of war. Arnold was now under great pressure to deliver.
The spectacle of the Eighth Air Force stalemated by German defenses and
unable to apply what had been expected to be decisive destruction was
most unwelcome. Arnold’s staff came to interpret the low frequency of
deep penetration raids on German targets, the casualties incurred in those
raids, and the continuing effectiveness of the German air defenses as evidence
of a failure of leader~hip.~~ Arnold himself, in fact, had pressed General
Eaker for quick results as early as June 1943. He urged Eaker to
dismiss those responsible for poor maintenance, ignoring the fact that
Eighth Air Force’s maintenance establishment had been gutted for Operation
TORCH (the invasion of Northwest Africa in November 1942) and had
only slowly been restored. As if Eaker were somehow guilty of avoiding
responsibility, Arnold admonished, “You must play your part.”46 He ques-
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