Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

SOUTHEAST ASIA
aircraft guns, NVAF MiGs did not have to carry the burden of combat
against U.S. air units.
What the North Vietnamese had constructed during the course of
ROLLING THUNDER was a fine-tuned system of air defense. As U.S. forces
countered one element-whether antiaircraft guns, fire control radars. or
MiG-17s-the North Vietnamese simply added another or increased
the action of some other, already existing, element. In March 1967. the
Office of the Secretary of Defense completed a special study (entitled
Night Song) of North Vietnam’s air defense system. The study concluded
that the North Vietnamese could, with Russian and Chinese assistance,
match the U.S. step for step in an air war of attrition conducted over the
North.7y The only ways to defeat the North Vietnamese air defense system
were 1) to cut off completely its outside sources of supply or 2) to develop
an attacking system that could respond faster than the North Vietnamese
defenses.
The key to North Vietnam’s defensive system was its communications
and intelligence network. To the degree that North Vietnamese defenders
knew when, where, and in what strength U.S. air attacks were scheduled,
the North Vietnamese could better mix their combination of guns, radars,
SAMs, and MiCs. Where the North Vietnamese lacked intelligence and
warning, U.S. aircraft losses were small and U.S. successes impressive.
Operation BOLO showed what deception could produce. The issue was
whether BOLO would remain an isolated, unique operation or become a
precedent for routine U.S. air operations against North Vietnam’s integrated
air defense system. In short, could U.S. air units take advantage of
North Vietnam’s air defense command and control system even though
they were not allowed to destroy it? If so, then air superiority over North
Vietnam would be guaranteed.
Gradually, U.S. air forces in Southeast Asia put together a command,
control, and intelligence network that was superior to that created by
North Vietnam. The first steps were taken in 1965: the development of
Navy and Air Force electronic surveillance and airborne early warning systems.
As ROLLING THUNDER progressed, Navy and Air Force command
centers and communications personnel achieved three additional
advances: the encryption of more communications between ground command
centers and planes in the air, the automation of information handling
and display, and the integration of USAF and USN tactical communication
networks. In 1965, for example, communications between the USAF Tactical
Air Control Center at Da Nang and the Navy’s Task Force 77 at
Yankee Station were by voice radio and teletype. When the Navy deployed
its new Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) and associated airborne early
warning aircraft to Yankee Station in November 1965, the Air Force Control
Center at Da Nang could not receive signals directly from the Navy
54 I