Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority - Air Force ...

AIR SUPERIORITY
fighters. American fighters needed more range; superior Japanese range
meant that most air combat in 1942 was over Allied bases, not over
Japanese bases. Also, inadequate fighter range meant that American
bombers attacked Japanese bases and Japanese shipping without escort,
which made them vulnerable to enemy interception. General Kenney
himself wrote: “our own short-sightedness, mine included, didn’t put
the range in our fighters to do this job out here.”27 Nor did American
bombers have enough defensive firepower. The B-17 was able to defend
itself better than other bombers, but experience demonstrated that it
could not operate unescorted in daylight without unacceptable losses.
Even the faster B-25, which at that time had only one forward-firing
machinegun, proved vulnerable to head-on attacks from Japanese fighters.
Incidentally, after heavy losses in New Guinea, General Kenney decided
the A-24 was too slow and too defenseless and phased this plane out of the
Allied Air Forces.28
The Japanese advance eastward and southward in the Pacific had been
accomplished by capturing an air base, sometimes with the aid of carrier
aircraft, then extending air cover for the next operation from that air base.
It was quickly obvious that if the Allies were to mount a counteroffensive,
it must be of the same nature. Guadalcanal and Papua were the beginning
of this process. The largely unopposed landing at Guadalcanal was made
under the short-lived cover of carrier aircraft, but further advances could
be covered by aircraft based on Guadalcanal. The move to the north coast
of New Guinea was protected and supported by planes based at Port
Moresby. Yet, before there could be further advances, bases had to be
established on the north coast. The distances that made establishment of
forward bases necessary also made advanced headquarters necessary to
control operations from these bases.
Essential to the achievement of air superiority was warning of
Japanese air attacks. Coastwatchers had a major part in providing warning
both in the Southwest Pacific and in the South Pacific, but it was in the
latter battles that they played the most critical role. At the beginning of the
war, American radar was primitive and unreliable, but by the end of 1942
much improved equipment was available. It became normal for Allied
bases to have at least thirty minutes warning before a Japanese air attack
arrived
The first year of the war saw the development of equipment and tactics
enabling American aircraft to meet the Japanese on more than equal terms
most of the time. American bombers were given more firepower, and more
frequently they had fighter escort. American fighters used tactics that more
than compensated for their lack of maneuverability. In the first place, their
armor, self-sealing tanks, and heavier engines enabled them to take more
punishment than the Japanese interceptors. Whenever possible, therefore,
Allied fighters engaged the Japanese from higher altitude and then, if nec-
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